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This thesis examines the economic situation and implica-
tions of a Soviet invasion of Poland. The analysis concerns
the state of the Polish and Soviet economies and the possible
economic effects of an invasion by the Soviet Union of Poland.
The hypothesis offered is that the weaknesses of the economic
system of the U.S.S.R. are of a magnitude that an invasion of
Poland would have such devastating economic consequences that
it is the major inhibiting factor to any like action. Al-
though a Soviet armed invasion is not completely ruled out,
the economic realities of both Poland and the Soviet Union
impose formidable constraints on any attempts to crush the
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union in the past, has shown strong inclinations
to put down any liberalization efforts, in the Eastern bloc
countries, by force. During 1968, in Czechoslovakia, the
Russian Army crushed a budding reform effort of much less in-
tensity than is now being experienced in Poland. The Kremlin
leaders are under immense pressure to crush Poland's rebellion.
The birth of a powerful independent trade union movement poses
a grave threat, in Soviet eyes, to their hold on Eastern Europe
Nevertheless, the Russian Army is being held at bay and inva-
sion does not appear imminent.
This pager's thesis is that the restraints on Soviet action
are, by and large, economic in nature. The Soviet economy is
showing signs of extreme weakness. An invasion would strain
the Russian economic system to the near breaking point and thus
remains a strong inhibitor to Soviet action. The Soviet
economic ills appear to be of such depth and magnitude that
no near term solutions will solve their dilemma allowing them
to resolve the Polish problem by force of arms
.
On July 1, 198 the Polish government of Edward Gierek
reduced food subsidies which raised selected meat prices
40-60 percent. These price increases themselves, though
affecting only 29% of meat sales, costing households well
under 1/2 of 1 percent of their disposable incomes and were
less extensive than those which provoked the riots of December

1970 and June 1976, triggered scattered labor strikes through-
2
out Poland. Initially the strikes were low-key and accompanied
mostly economic demands that were responded to by ad hoc wage
increases. Soon however they became general in the Baltic
area and took on a political character as well. By August the
labor unrest coalesced into a well organized and disciplined
workers movement with 350,000 Polish laborers on strike in the
major industrial centers of Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot, Szczecin
and Elblag.
The price increases were to a large extent caused by ex-
ternal pressures of Western banking concerns. On April 24,
1980 fifty Western bankers gathered at the Victoria Hotel in
Warsaw. They wanted Poland to reduce costly subsidies of
food. The Polish pricing system kept food, particularly sugar
and meat, well below market levels, at an annual cost to the
Polish government of more than $6 billion, amounting to 25
4percent of 1979 national expenditures. The Poles who were
looking for an additional $500 million loan and were well
aware of the need for structural changes and price-mechanism
reforms, did not demur.
The Polish government in an attempt to diminish the chances
of adverse reaction, initially announced the price increases on
only a few cuts of meat, which had long since disappeared from
the market place anyway. The government clearly thought a
gradual implementation of price increases throughout Poland
would halt the reaction which forced the recall of increases
in 1970 and 1976. The leadership was proven to be wrong.

By the end of August the government of Gierek was forced
by the deteriorating economy to grant unprecedented demands
to the workers. By September, independent trade unions were
being organized and Edward Gierek had been removed as head of
the Polish Communist Party. The collapse of the Gierek
leadership ostensibly appeared to be caused by selective meat
price increases. More accurately the collapse reflected the
degree of political and social bankruptcy of the party and
state in Poland.
The labor movements themselves were dramatically different
from the riots and strikes that had trembled Poland thrice
since 1956. The recent unrest was initiated, arranged and
dominated by the workers. In times past, workers have revolt-
ed when the Communist Party was visibly fractured and the
intelligentsia were insurrecting. This time the strikes
occurred when Gierek had the most homogeneous leadership
since World War II. The intellectuals warned of the crisis
but offered no leadership or solutions. Dissident groups
formed after the 1976 price riots had no popular following
g
and felt isolated from the working class.
This time the workers prevailed in a political vacuum.
The dissidents and their intellectual colleagues had to run
to catch up. The leadership had no other choice but to concede
to the strikers' demands. The workers were too strong and soon
too well organized to be put down by force even if the Army
could be counted on. Poland's existing debt made it impos-
sible to buy off localized disaffection with special food
10

shipments. The Communist Party itself proved to be so weak
that it could neither lead nor stop the workers. The ultimate
crime had been committed in Soviet eyes — the Party had lost
control.
The agreements in Gdansk and the growing power of the
Polish union movement pushed back the boundaries of economic
and political change beyond that which had been thought of as
possible since 1968, when Soviet troops terminated the reforms
in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet leadership certainly understood
the seriousness of the Polish crisis. In ideological terms
an unacceptable group, the free trade unions, had achieved a
significant degree of real power in Poland. Somehow or other,
this situation had to be changed, for none of the other bloc
nations had entered the 19 80s free from the specter of real
economic crisis. Poland was the first and most severe case
of economic failure but it appeared as if it would not be the
last. The Soviets would have to weaken or emasculate the
free trade unions, and full party control reestablished over
the Polish proletariat or face the possibility of growing
unrest that could affect not only the bloc countries but the
Soviet Union as well.
The Kremlin leadership took an early decision to demon-
strate their concern and to increase their options by a large-
scale military build-up in and around Poland. The Soviet
forces in the area remained at a high level of readiness after
the Autumn Warsaw Pact exercises, especially the units in the
11

western military districts of the USSR, and East Germany as
well as the two tank divisions in Poland. Existing units were
substantially reinforced while continued exercises were held
in surrounding areas. By late November 1980 the Soviets had
massed a force of 25-30 divisions in a high state of readiness.
United States defense officials estimated that the positioned
forces could mount an invasion with only two or three days
notice. Furthermore/ General Ivanovski, the former Commander-
in-Chief of Soviet forces in East Germany, was put in command
of the Belorussian military district, the most probable route
q
for an invasion of Poland.
At the time of this writing the Soviet forces have failed
to invade. The option of invasion certainly remains open, but
it is clearly an option of desperation to the Soviet leadership
The reasons why the Soviets failed to act with force as they
had in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and of late, Afghanistan, are
many, and the understanding of these reasons are imperative
for Western countries if they are to deal effectively with the
Soviet Union in the future.
The risks of an invasion of Poland would be considerable.
Among the most obvious risks and the great imponderable in any
invasion scenario is how much resistance the Poles would put
up. Their 317,500-man armed force is the largest in the entire
Warsaw Pact aside from the Soviets and could conceivably cause
the Russian Army considerable opposition. According to some
media sources, Polish generals have warned Soviet commanders
12

that military intervention would be regarded as an act of war
9
and be resisted by force of arms.
Even if a Soviet invasion were to overcome these obstacles,
the subsequent military occupation would face extreme
difficulties. As Solidarity leader Lech Walesa candidly put
it, "Soviet tanks can occupy the country but they will not
get it to work again. " The economic problems of a Soviet
invasion could be overwhelming to the faltering Soviet economy.
The Polish economic problems would be more intractable than
before. The need for the Soviet Union to provide welfare
assistance to a large Polish population, the requirement to
absorb the enormous national debt of Poland, combined with
considerable western economic sanctions which are sure to be
levied against the Soviet Union would cause monumental stresses
and pressures on an already strained economy.
This paper will look at the economic restraints and pos-
sible consequences of a Soviet invasion of Poland. Following
the introduction, Section two provides an in depth examina-
tion of the Soviet economic system — its problems and prospects
It dwells on the present day weaknesses of the Soviet economy
as well as the trends which undoubtedly would be greatly exacer-
bated by the enormous strain a Polish invasion would place on
the Soviet economy. The third section of this thesis will
address a detailed analysis of the Polish problem, analyzing
the economic weaknesses and political forces of today's
Poland. The last part of this paper provides a summation of
13

the economics of a Soviet invasion of Poland. It further pro-
vides short term forecasts of possible Soviet actions and their
probable consequences on Poland and the Soviet economic health.
14

II. SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
The Soviet Union faces formidable economic problems in the
1980s which shall put severe strains on an already burdened
economy. The Soviet economic plan for 1981 through 1985, calls
for the lowest economic growth rates since World War II which
illustrates the downward trend that has become increasingly
more apparent in the recent past.
Soviet economic plans are historically quite optimistic
documents with a poor track record for exact accomplishment.
The draft five year plan, unveiled in Moscow December 1, 1980
targets a total economic growth rate of 18 to 20 percent. That
goal is a sharp comedown from the target of 24 to 28 percent
in the 1976-80 plan. This earlier target was not achieved.
Actual growth in that five year period was only 18.7 percent
or 3.7 percent annually, and in 1980 the growth rate dropped
to an estimated 3.5 percent.
The overall Soviet economic performance for the past
quarter century has in many respects shown outstanding
performance. The Soviet Gross National Product grew at an
annual rate of about 5.1 percent. In contrast, the United
States has had a less stellar performance with a 3.8 percent
12
annual growth rate. The gain for the Soviet consumer, result-
ing in a standard of living lower than nearly all industrial
countries, was nonetheless quite impressive. Since 1950, per
capita consumption has risen at an average rate of nearly
15

4 percent, a gain in material goods and services of over two
and a half times. Considerable gains have occurred across the
board, more and better food, housing, clothing, as well as
personal and community services
.
The Soviet diet remains starchy and the nation's ineffi-
cient supply and distribution system results in recurrent
shortages. Despite, this, the rise in per capita consumption
has satisfied the expectations of the consumer until recent
times. Consumption of meats and fats by Soviet citizens
has risen from 26 kilograms per capita in 1950 to 57 kilo-
grams per capita in 1977. During the same period, per capita
consumption of starchy foods, grain products and potatoes,
14fell from 413 kilograms to 262 kilograms. In 1950, the
average Soviet bought one pair of shoes per year; in 1977,
three pair were purchased. Although still quite meager by
Western standards, household durables have exhibited a dramat-
ic rise. In 1960, only 4 of every 100 families owned a
refrigerator or washing machine. Only 8 of every 100 families
owned a television set, while automobiles were just for the
elite. By 1977, nearly two-thirds of all families owned some
kind of refrigeration system and washing machines, and over
three quarters had a television set. Approximately 4 percent
15
of all families owned a car.
A nation with a significant increase of per capita con-
sumption, as has been experienced in the Soviet Union,
ordinarily must give up something like guns, but the rapid
16

expansion of the Soviet GNP has been sufficient to sustain
both. In the past fifteen years military spending has increased
at about the same ratio as the overall GNP, while during the
past several years the rate of growth has been about twice
that of the GNP, accounting for about 11 to 18 percent of all
output. By contrast, defense spending by the United States,
accounted for approximately 8 percent of the GNP in 197 during
the Vietnam War and for only 4.9 percent in 1979 with a slow
1
6
rise to 5.9 percent by fiscal year 1982. The Soviets, ac-
cording to Senator Nunn, "have built the most awesome military
17
machine the world has ever seen."
The Soviet economic growth performance statistically par-
allels many war destroyed economies of other industrialized
countries. The most striking difference is its distinctive
downward trend at a relatively low standard of living. The
prospect for the next decade for the Soviet economy is con-
tinued slow growth if not stagnation or even decline. The
possibilities of large standard of living increases for Soviet
citizens are few. An invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union
would result in the Soviet citizens being forced to suffer
significant economic hardships in the short term and continued
economic penalties in the long. The pertinent question is at
what level of economic depravation Soviet citizenry are will-




The factors responsible for the slow down of economic
growth have been known for some time. Attempts have been
made by Moscow leaders to offset the downward trend with less
than satisfactory results. The major causes of the economic
growth slow down are:
1. Inefficient, poorly motivated workers;
2. A slowdown in growth of capital investment;
3. An inefficient and undependable agricultural system;
and,
4. A lack of hard currency earners needed to pay for
18technology and grain purchases.
During this decade we are likely to see these problems
intensify. Furthermore, two new problems are becoming apparent
which will greatly aggravate the economic strain: a sharp
decline in the growth of the working population and an energy
19
and raw material constraint.
A. DEMOGRAPHICS
The Soviet economy has been hampered since the 19 60s by
slow technological advancement and now faces an additional
constraint in the 1980s, a slow growth of the labor force.
The Soviet formula for economic success has been heavily
dependent on labor, generally a significantly larger amount
than other developed nations . To maintain the growth rate
of the 1970 level will require a large emphasis on product-
ivity rather than labor.
18

The Soviet Union is now experiencing an unprecedented
decline in the size of increments to the population of able-
bodied workers. This trend is aggravated by the period of
schooling required for the upcoming worker force which is
longer than for previous groups, resulting in a shorter work
life as long as the pension age remains the same. Moreover,
the proportion of the population in the pension ages will
rise from 15 percent at the present to 19 percent by the end
of this century. At the same time the source of the popula-
tion increase is becoming increasingly more centered around
the Caucasus, Northern Caucasus, and especially in Soviet
Central Asia which are largely underdeveloped regions . These
areas, unlike the rest of the country, are undergoing a demo-
graphic explosion among its native Muslim population. Further-
more, the Muslims of Soviet Central Asia who could enter the
labor force not only lack material incentives to migrate but
are unwilling to venture outside their own territories and
are often not disposed to factory work as such, even in their
own cities. Moreover, Soviet industry is unable to provide
enough material incentive to encourage voluntary migration,
especially to rich and labor-hungry but climatically difficult
areas, such as most of Siberia. With or without this move-
ment there will be serious labor shortages in the industrial-
ized areas of the country and the rate of economic growth
20possibly will slow down.
19

Annual increments to the Soviet working class averaged
2.5 million during 1971-75 and will decline to 1.6 million
21by the mid-1980s. To maintain the GNP growth at the 1970
level, an increase in labor productivity of 3.5 percent is
needed for the next five years, while a 4.5 percent increase
in productivity will be required from 1986-1990 to maintain a
22
5 percent GNP growth rate. Realization of the labor force
constraint is one factor in the uncharacteristically low
production plans for the eighties.
Michael Rywkin writing in Problems of Economics , compares
the Soviet labor shortages as "quite similar" to those of the
23 . .West. In the discussion of the distribution of labor in
the USSR, Rywkin fails to mention the degree to which the
population is a result of the violent demographic history of
the Soviet state. The make up of the work force and the
slowing of its growth are the results not only of low birth
rates of the 1960s but an overall aging population. The
aging of the population is quite unsimiliar to the aging of
the United States "baby boom" phenomena, but rather the result
of normal births between the various slaughters of the past
revolutionary, precollectivization period of the 1920s.
(Refer to tables 2-1 and 2-2)
The age/sex pyramids (Table 2-3)of the Soviet Union reflect
the changes of the vital rates and demographic catastrophes
which have occurred since 1897. Helene Carrere D'Encousse
reports in her book, Decline of an Empire, that between 1914
20

and 1946, the estimated demographic deficit of the various wars
and purges cost the Soviet nation sixty million people, or one-















































Age Group Percentage Compared to Total Soviet Population
Age Group 1897 1939 1959 1970
0-19 years 48.8
20-59 years 44.8




The First World War cost the Soviets about three million
people; in the Second World War, they lost twenty to thirty
million lives, seven million of which were soldiers. In addi-
tion to these, considerable losses were incurred during the
various slaughters between 1918 and 1936. The civil war alone


































































resulted in the loss of five million lives. Two million emi-
grants fled the revolution, resulting in the loss of an esti-
mated 8.5 million births. As of 1921, the population losses
stood at twenty-six million. The relatively calm years of the
New Economic Policy of the 1920s produced a surge of births
shown in Table 2-3. The respite, however, proved to be brief.
The 19 30s ushered in a new Stalin initiated butchery dur-
ing which Khruschev estimated that 10 million Soviet lives were
lost. In all probability, the figure is significantly higher.
The 1937 census revealed that a gap of 14.7 million lives
existed between forecast and reality. Collectivization and
mass deportation killed many, as did the resulting famine of
1933-34 which alone killed more than 3 million infants. The
purges also claimed at least another 1 to 2 million lives.
These catastrophes are readily discernable in the age pyramids.
The general shift in the age of the population becomes quite
noticeable in the 1970 pyramid and the drop of birth rate in
the pyramid for 1970 and 2000.
Another indicator of the increasing average age of the
Soviet citizen is the death rate. The rate of Soviet deaths
per one thousand inhabitants, as shown in Table 2-4, reveals
that it hit its lowest rate in 1961 and has been rising ever
since. This is primarily the result of the fact that as the
population grows older, people die in greater numbers despite








Year Per 1, 00 inhabitants per 1,000
Natural
Births Deaths Increase Births
1913
a) within pre-
1939 borders 47.0 30.2 16.8 273
b) within pre-
sent day bor-
ders OJ: USSR 45.5 29.1 16.4 269
1926 44.0 20.3 23.7 174
1928 44.3 23.3 21.0 182
1937 38.7 18.9 19.8 170
1938 37.5 17.5 20.0 161
1939 36.5 17.3 19.2 167
1940 31.2 18.0 13.2 182
1950 26.7 9.7 17.0 81
1955 25.7 8.2 17.5 60
1956 25.2 7.6 17.6 47
1957 25.4 7.8 17.6 45
1958 25.3 7.2 18.1 41
1959 25.0 7.6 17.4 41
1960 24.9 7.1 17.8 35
1961 23.8 7.2 16.6 32
1962 22.4 7.5 14.9 32
1963 21.1 7.2 13.9 31
1964 19.5 6.9 12.6 29
1965 18.4 7.3 11.1 27
1966 18.2 7.3 10.9 26
1967 17.3 7.6 9.7 26
1968 17.2 7.7 9.5 26
1969 17.0 8.1 8.9 26
1970 17.4 8.2 9.2 25
1971 17.8 8.2 9.6 23
1972 17.8 8.5 9.3 24
1973 17.6 8.6 9.0 26
24

The decline in fertility, also shown in Table 2-4, began
in the early 1960s. The causes for the fertility decrease
can be partly attributed to classical factors such as the
high state of urbanization and some additional conditions
unique to the Soviet Union. Table 2-5 clearly shows a declin-
ing number of women between the 16-30 year age bracket, the
most favorable years for maternity. As the Soviet society
gets older as a whole, there are relatively fewer women of
child bearing years. Moreover, women are marrying at an
older age which reduces the period of fertility; table 2-6
reveals this additional demographic problem.
Perhaps the most significant pressure for keeping family
size down in urban areas is the critical shortage of apart-
ments and day care centers. The Soviet citizen's rising
aspirations for a better life tend to keep the level of births
at a minimum. Only since 1974 has a concerted national policy
been adopted to encourage births . Incentives such as increas-
ing the number of day care facilities, providing "aid for
children" payments of a nominal 12 rubles per child per month
to low income families, partially paying a woman's salary dur-
ing a period of one years maternity leave, and awarding such
titles as "Heroine Mother," "Glory of Motherhood Order," and
motherhood medals for women with large families have been
offered.
It seems unlikely that these inducements will provide for
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1939 1959 1970 1939 1959 1970
48.8 58.5 60.8 25.4 28.0 25.2
24.3 26.9 23.9 12.7 12.9 9.9
24.1 31.6 36.9 12.7 15.1 15.3
Table 2-6 30
Number of Married Women (per 1000 women)
























Age 70 and over 168
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short-term work force reductions. There has, though, been a
recent rise in fertility of females between the ages of 15 to
19 years old. It is presently impossible to say if this signi-
32fies any long term trend. Recently there has also been a
rapid rise in infant mortality from 22.9 in 1971 to 30.5
33deaths per 1000 live births in 1975. Since 1975 the Soviets
have stopped reporting infant mortality rates. Additionally,
death rates in every age group have risen dramatically in
recent years. Between 1970 and 1975 death rates increased
almost 20 percent for people in their fifties, by more than
30 percent for those in their forties. The causes behind
these figures are not clear. In a recent study by Murray
Feshbuck and Christopher Davis, they speculate that alcohol-
ism, pollution, accidents, suicide and declining medical care
. . .
. 34due to insufficient investment are all contributing factors.
The 1970 Soviet census revealed that not only have birth
rates continued to fall, but an increasing differentiation
between national regions had developed which is completely
altering the population balance of the country.
Table 2-7 brings to light that the previous balance
between Slavs and non-Slavic nationalities is in a state of
rapid flux, with birth rates and increased population growth
shifting markedly in favor of the non-Slavic elements. Table






Population Trends in the Republics








Republics 1913 1939 1959 1970 1959 1979 1970
USSR 159,153 190,678 208,827 241,720 116 262,442 109
RSFSR 89,902 108,377 117,534 130,079 111 137,552 106
Ukraine 35,210 40,469 41,869 47,126 113 49,757 106
Belorussia 6,899 8,912 8,056 9,002 112 9,559 106
Uzbekistan 4,334 6,347 8,119 11,800 145 15,391 130
Kazakhstan 5,597 6,082 9,295 13,009 140 14,685 113
Georgia 2,601 3,540 4,044 4,686 116 5,016 107
Azerbaudzhan 2,339 3,205 3,698 5,117 138 6,028 118
Lithuania 2,828 2,880 2,711 3,128 115 3,399 109
Moldavia 2,056 2,452 2,885 3,569 124 3,948 111
Latvia 2,493 1,885 2,093 2,364 113 2,521 107
Kirghizia 864 1,458 2,066 2,933 142 3,529 120
Tadzhikistan 1,034 1,458 1,981 2,900 146 3,801 131
Armenia 1,000 1,282 1,763 2,492 141 3,031 122
Turkmenia 1,042 1,252 1,516 2,195 142 2,759 128
Estonia 954 1,052 1,197 1,356 113 1,466 108
Table 2-8
Percentage of Ethnic Groups Compared
with Total Population











The population of the Moslem republics has climbed from
3724 million to 35 million in one decade. The projections
indicate that the increase of the able-bodied ages in Central
Asia and Kazakhstan will actually exceed that of the USSR as
a whole during the 1980s. V. Perevedentseu, a Soviet
44.4 47.5 54.6 53.4
19.4 21.4 17.8 16.9
4.5 3.6 3.8 3.7
1.9 1.7 2.4 2.5
12.1 10.1 10.3 12.9
3.5 2.4 1.1 0.9
3.9 3.6 3.8 3.8
1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1
2.3 2.2 1.5 1.4
1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2
28

demographic commentator, noted that each 1,000 women will
bear an average of 1,986 children during their lives. In
38Fadzhikistan, however, the average will be 6,071.
The unequal population growth is a formidable obstacle
for Kremlin planners. The Central Asian region is largely
resource poor, while the eastern regions, which occupy the
greater portion of the territory of the USSR, holds 87 per-
cent of all potential energy resources of the country (includ-
ing 89 percent of coal reserves and 66 percent of natural gas
resources) and 70 percent of the hydroelectric resources.
Siberia and the Far East possess rich reserves of iron, copper,
lead, zinc, and nickel ores, mercury, tin, mineral salts,
water and forest resources, considerable fish resources, etc.
However, only 25 percent of the country's population live in
39the eastern region.
The territorial redistribution of labor resources will be
necessary if the Soviet government is to make efficient use
of the large population growth among the non-Slavic peoples.
To do so, about 9 million workers would have to be moved
between 1980-90. The overwhelming weight of evidence indi-
cates that this is not occurring. On the contrary, patterns
of migration show net flow from other regions of the USSR
into Central Asia, Kazgkhstan and the transcaucasian regions.
Between 1959-72, for every 100 who migrated out of the region,
159 moved in. This high influx is primarily caused by the
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for its growing urban centers and it is the result of sun belt
seekers attempting to avoid the difficult climatic conditions
of the north. (Refer to table 2-9)
The prospects for substantial out migration of the high
birth rate areas seems distinctly unfavorable. A study con-
ducted by Murray Feshback identified a myriad of reasons why
migration is not likely to increase in the near future. The
following are cited by Feshback as the basis for his
predictions:
1. Living Standards: Income per family is higher in
Central Asia and the Caucasus than in the U.S.S.R.
as a whole. Although per capita income is lower, the
cost of living is low enough to negate the desire-
ability of higher wages in the R.S.F.S.R.
2. Cultural Factors: There exists a traditional opposi-
tion to the inter-marriage of Moslems with Russians.
Also, 'The Muslim peoples of the Central Asian
Republics feel that their region is the cradle of
civilization. . . They have a deep attachment to the
ancestral lands and believe that to leave the abode
of Islam for the abode of war is a sin against the
community.
'
3. Poor educational preparation for industry: There
is a definite shortage of vocational-technical
schools in Central Asia and enrollment in Central
Asian republics averages 7 per 1000 population vs
.
15 in the R.S.F.F.S.R.
4. Job Opportunities and Industrial Development: There
are numerous positions available in industrial centers
of Central Asia for trained Moslems. Although invest-
ment has slackened, it appears that there will be
ample opportunities for skilled wageworkers to remain
in Central Asia.
5. Poor Knowledge of Russian Language: The inability of
most Central Asians to speak Russian, even as a second
language, limits their usefulness fow roking in indus-
trial centers of the R.S.F.S.R.
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6. Birthrates: High birth rates and large families
prevent movement in general, but especially to
heavily populated industrial areas
.
A. U. Topilin, in a study centering on material disincent-
ives for migration, noted that the standard of living in east-
ern regions is extremely crude, that there has been a large
lag in the number of houses, schools, hospitals and service
centers in Siberia and the Far East which is the result pri-
marily of an inadequate volume of investment and construction
facilities. He concluded that it will be very difficult to
move the eastern regions to an advantageous postiion within
43
a 5 to 7 year time frame
.
Central Asians have further demonstrated an extreme
reluctance to move from their homeland and even more so, from
their farms. This reluctance is shown by the high percentage
of the area's population in agriculture. Only two Central
Asian republics have less than 30 percent of the population
in agriculture, while only two European republics have more
44than 30 percent in the same field.
Forced migration is presently doubtful. The Soviets would
have to face a political reaction not only from Central Asian
republics, but also from Moslem countries with whom the U.S.S.R.
has shown that it wishes to maintain close relations.
The decrease of the number of workers entering the market
and the unequal population growth present the Soviet economic
planners with a strong need to obtain productivity growth
through labor innovation. Soviet planners are hoping that a
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tighter labor market will surface "hidden labor reserves"
thereby making their use more efficient. Past efforts have
shown some success in this area. The Shehekin Experiment,
which began in 1967, was implemented to reduce extraneous
labor and is now standard procedure in most enterprises.
Under the experiment, wages saved by reducing employees,
. . 45
were distributed among the remaining workers. It is felt,
however, that most such slack has already been removed from
industrial manning and further reductions of manning will be
counter productive, unless a major program of labor saving
device production is instituted.
Farm personnel have been the traditional reservoir of labor
According to the estimates given, the share of the labor force
in agriculture dropped from 54.0 percent in 1950 to 30.7 per-
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cent in 1970 and again to 21.8 percent in 1975. The absolute
figure for agriculture workers is 35 million persons. This is
still more than 7 times that of comparable American figures.
Nevertheless, as table 2-10 shows the working population is
getting increasingly older. The residual laborers are largely
unskilled and elderly and fail to provide agriculture with the
efficient labor needed. Further migration from rural to urban
areas will undoubtedly adversely affect agricultural output.
The Soviet Union has little room for labor expansion as
already a large segment of society composes the work force.
In 1970, 89 percent of the females and 93 percent of the males
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60 and over 7.8 14.1 11.9 14.4
time students, disabled or residents of institutions, leaving
the only additional sources among the 16-19 year olds and the
retired. 47
The Soviet retirement policy is liberal, even in com-
parison with other communist countries (55 for women, 60 for
men) . The 1970 census showed little participation in the
labor force by those of retirement age. This is thought to be
illusionary because the census had no category for pensioners
working part time. Nevertheless, the labor force can receive
a one time gain by increasing the retirement ages.
The labor shortage problem is considered serious and not
easily solved. Some present efforts include the importation
of foreign labor. In 1973, indications of the use of foreign
labor first became evident. Most interesting is the utiliza-
tion of 20,000 East Europeans in the building of the Orenburg
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pipeline. Also noted were some 30,000 Bulgarians, 7,000 North
Koreans and 3,000 Finns for use on various work projects.
With a work force of 156 million, the overall effect of foreign
labor, however, is small.
The military with its 4-4.5 million able bodied men would
seem a likely candidate for force reduction to benefit the
civilian economy. Nevertheless, it is not considered likely
in the years ahead, that the size of the military sector will
be reduced. Despite overall increased scarcity of investment
funds, the military maintains an enormous and growing share
of the economic resources of the nation. This shows a large
commitment to the military, indicating a distinct preference
for military power over economic growth. It seems unlikely
that the Soviets will reduce military manning if for the only
reason of the need to adequately staff current construction
projects underway. Further, a large force reduction would be
necessary to have an appreciable affect on the work force of
more than 156 million workers. Such reductions appear unlikely
and would require a complete reorientation of priorities which
would be wholly uncharacteristic of those in power at the
present time.
The best bet still appears to be improvement of product-
ivity. In March of 1975, N. Rogorsky, head of the Labor
Department and member of the State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN)
made reference to the gradual elimination of heavy manual labor




however, that there was no current program for mechanization.
On the other hand, some Soviets argue that increased consumer
goods and better housing are possibly more important to higher
labor productivity than additional capital stock. Consumer
goods, however, have made little headway in the past few years.
Considering past performance and future plans, most experts
believe that the Soviets' efforts will not be entirely success-
ful and a downturn in their economy is inevitable. Popula-
tion and migration trends seem not to be cooperating with
Soviet needs for an improved economic climate.
B. THE ENERGY CONSTRAINT
In 1967, the Polish analyst Stanislas Albinowski suggested
that by 1980 the CMEA countries would find themselves in an
oil deficit by as much as 100 million tons per year and that
it would increase thereafter. Since that time, Western com-
mentators have periodically addressed themselves to the issue
of Soviet oil production.
In 1976, just after the Soviets published their five year
plan, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) predicted that
both the oil and natural gas targets would be underfilled by
52
a considerable amount. The real shockers, however, were
published in early 1977. Three reports, two concerning Soviet
oil prospects and one on the general oil situation, brought
the energy situation in the Soviet Union into the limelight.
These publications , which in some cases radically departed
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from the conclusions of other public materials, have given
rise to lively debate which continues to this day.
The most important aspects of the original CIA report were
the assertions that:
"The Soviet oil industry is in trouble. Soviet oil pro-
duction will soon peak, possibly as early as next year
and certainly not later than the early 1980' s. The
maximum level of output is likely to be between 11 and
12 mmbd (500-600 million tons) , but it is not likely
to be maintained and the decline, when it comes, will
be sharp. Before 1985, the USSR probably will find
itself not only unable to supply oil to Eastern Europe
and the West on the present scale but also having to
compete for OPEC oil for its own use. Although there
will be some substitution of coal and gas for oil in
domestic use, the scale of such substitution will be
small before 1985. Neither hydroelectric power trans-
mission from the east, nor the construction of nuclear
powerplants can afford much relief until well past 1985.
We estimate that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
will require a minimum of 3.5 mmbd/ (175 million T/Y)
of imported oil by 1985. At worst, slumping production
could lead to import requirements as large as 4.5 mmbd
(225 million T/Y) . " 53
The CIA analysis of Soviet oil production had changed
little publicly from 1977 until the Director of the CIA pub-
lished a statement in 1980. In testimony to the Senate Energy
Committee, Admiral Turner noted that, " ... the Communist
countries as a group are projected to shift from a net export
position ... to a net import position of at least 1 million
54bpd (50 million tons per year) in 1985." Although the
Director's statement reiterated the belief that Soviet oil
production in 198 5 would not exceed 500 million tons, it is
clear that the Agency has backed off its 19 77 prediction of
net CMEA imports of oil reaching 175-225 million tons by
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mid-1980s. Furthermore, this statement concedes that the
Soviets will not need to import oil for themselves in the next
five years.
In early May 1981, CIA analyst James Noren, speaking before
Soviet study scholars at Harvard University stated that the
CIA has upgraded its estimate of the Soviet's 1985 oil output
to between 10 million and 11 million barrels a day (500-600
million T/Y) . Professor Marshall Goldman, who is an economics
professor at Wellesley College and the Associate Director of
Harvard's Russian Research Center, commenting on these latest
CIA figures expressed the opinion that even these figures are
too pessimistic. A draft of the CIA report calls 1980 the
record year for Soviet oil production, but Mr. Goldman says
1981 production has been running about 2.5% ahead of last
year's 11.9 million barrel-a-day rate.
Whatever the exact situation of Soviet oil production is,
one point stands clear: Soviet petroleum production is not
living up to Kremlin expectations. The 1978 goal for oil
production set in December 1975 at 580 million T/Y, was lowered
in December 1977 to 575 million T/Y. The actual figure was
571 million T/Y, or about 70,000 bpd below the revised plan
or 170,000 bpd below the original goal. In 1979, the produc-
tion goal was lowered from 610 million T/Y to 593 million T/Y.
Actual output was 58 6 million T/Y. The 19 80 production plan
was 620 to 640 million tons while output totaled just 603




Soviet Oil Production 1960-80
In million tons Annual percent increase
1960 147.8 1960-65 = 11.0
1965 242.4 1965-70 = 7.9
1970 353.0 1970-75 = 5.7
1975 491.0 496 8.6
1976 519.7 520 5.8
1977 546.0 550 5.1
1978 571.4 575 4.7
1979 586.0 593 2.6
1980 603.0 620-640 2.9
Soviet oil production has not peaked. As table 2-11
illustrates, it has risen from 546 million tons in 1977 to
586 million in 1979 and 603 million in 1980.
Nevertheless, the picture given in the table is one of an
industry where the growth rate is slowing down dramatically,
whether measured in percentage increase or actual physical
increments. Moreover, it is an industry whose targets are
not being met with the degree of underfulfillment of 37
million tons in 1980.
On balance the CIA has been correct in identifying some
basic problems in the Soviet oil industry and the implications
of the possible solutions. The CIA emphasizes that the emer-
gence of a Soviet energy problem could affect developments
ranging from the world price of oil to political stability
in Eastern Europe. Falling energy output would make it much
more difficult for the Soviet Union to meet domestic growth
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targets or maintain commitments to Eastern Europe. A Soviet
Union faced with the prospects of an energy deficit could react
in a number of different ways. Controls and belts could be
tightened at home or the Soviets could try to assure their
access to Middle East oil. They might even accept wholesale
Western assistance in their oil development.
To some extent, all of the Soviet options involve the use
of Western technology. In fact, the availability of advanced
energy equipment and technology is still the limiting factor
in Soviet energy development. In past successful efforts to
increase oil production, the USSR relied on domestic resources
for equipment and know-how. More recently, the Soviets have
encountered ever more difficult exploration and development
problems that have forced them to turn to the West for modern
equipment and technology to maintain increases in oil output.
As greater emphasis is placed on deeper drilling, offshore
exploration and development in Arctic regions , and enhanced
recovery operations in older producing regions, the Soviet
Union will have to rely more heavily on imports of Western
equipment and technical assistance. For example, the sophis-
ticated seismic equipment and digital processing units could
facilitate the mapping of complex traps - both structural and
stratigraphic - in the perma frost areas of East and West
Siberia and in the Barents and Kara Seas.
An invasion of Poland by Soviet forces would certainly be
accompanied by strong trade embargos from the West which
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would most probably include oil development and production
equipment. The Soviet oil problems are increasingly requir-
ing the use of Western technology which in itself may not be
enough to halt the fall off of growth in Soviet oil production.
Without it the chances are slim that Soviet oil production
could remain at its present output level with a sharp fall off
being quite likely.
The effects of a significant decline in Soviet oil produc-
tion would be a catastrophe of unprecedented proportions not
only to the Soviet nation but also to Eastern Europe. With
the CMEA nations heavily dependent on cheap Soviet oil and
with their extremely limited hard currency earnings capability,
a cut off of oil from the USSR would spell economic ruin for
most of the Warsaw Pact countries.
The Soviet Union faces serious problems in oil production
which is likely to result in a no-growth position by the mid-
1980s and a possible energy decline beginning as early as 1985.
The result of such a decline of the Soviet Union should not
be under estimated. Since 193 5, 8 5 percent of all growth in
Soviet energy production was accounted for by crude oil and
57
natural gas. Furthermore, in 1980 the Soviet Union exported
75 million tons of oil which accounted for 50 percent of its
58hard currency earnings. The $11 billion received in 1980
for petroleum and petroleum products could have covered the
cost of the massive grain imports which were purchased that
year, or the large quantity of Western technological items
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which prop up their economy. The loss of either or both could
have enormous effects on the economic and social health of the
USSR.
The Kremlin leadership is not unaware of the problems
facing oil production. A major shift in energy policy was
initiated at the December 1977 plenum of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party. This policy called for a crash pro-
gram to concentrate oil industry resources in West Siberia,
the area with the most sizable output increases in recent years
Despite the massive resource shift, the Soviet leadership
faces difficult problems, which could prove to be impossible
to overcome and maintain output growth for the next decade in
the best of circumstances. It is generally recognized among
world oil experts that even under the most favorable assump-
tions, Soviet oil production cannot continue to increase in-
definitely and although it has been claimed that totals will
increase through 1990, the stronger impression is that produc-
tion will peak in the near future at a level that the country
will attempt to hold through 1990 or perhaps commence a slow
decline starting in 1985.
The Soviet oil production problem is certainly not the
result of lack of commitment. The Soviets expend as much
effort on producing oil as all the free world countries com-
bined and the effort is growing in magnitude. Due to obsolete
equipment and low worker productivity, however, the results
are only a fraction of those of the West. For example in 197 6,
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the Soviets only drilled one-fifth the footage as did the U.S.
firms even though roughly the same number of rigs were employed
Total Soviet drilling for oil and gas in 1980 was less than
78.2 million feet. By comparison total U.S. drilling is esti-
mated at 273 million feet. During 1966-70 total Soviet capital
investment in the oil industry was about $2.4 billion. By
1978 the figure was $7.6 billion and current outlays are
believed to be close to $11 billion or about 13 percent of all
59Soviet industrial capital investment.
The post war history of the Soviet petroleum industry is
one of large increases in production with relatively small
additional costs. By 1970, production was increased dramatical-
ly with only a 210 percent rise in drilling and only a 51 per-
cent increase in rigs (1119 to 1760) . This was possible by
the extremely rich and accessible oil deposits in the Ural-
Volga region. The output went from 1000,000 bpd in 1950 to
6
4.2 million in 1970. By 1970, older fields in the Ukraine,
North Caucasus and Azerbaydzhan started to decline in produc-
tion, while the fields of the Urals-Volga leveled off. Only
by over working the West Siberian fields were production goals
met.
The crux of the Soviet oil production problem is that
25 percent of Soviet oil comes from the giant Siberian field
called Samotlor. Samotlor production appears to be leveling
off and may have already peaked. The controversial December
1977 plan calls for concentrating resources on oil and gas
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development in West Siberia's Tyuman'Oblast. The most im-
mediate consequence of the December plenum has been the
decision to pull drilling brigades out of the Volga-Urals
Fields and place them in West Siberian sites. The change of
drilling policy seems to be based on the appreciation that:
(a) the declining prospects for the Samotlor oil fields, (b)
the critical rundown of West Siberian oil reserves following
a decade of insufficient exploration; (c) the steeply rising
level of resources and manpower needed to drill more and more
wells in increasingly less productive deposits farther and
farther from established support bases and transportation.
The Soviet leadership is gambling that production increases
from West Siberia will more than compensate for the likely
shortfall in the Volga-Urals. Recent indications show this
effort has paid off. In the long run, however, concentration
on Tyumen 1 will weaken a more broadly based effort that might
hold greater promise for the future. No giant oilfield has
been found in West Siberia in the last 10 years, while all of
the large promising structures in West Siberia reportedly
6 2have been drilled. The Soviets estimate that to replace
reserves produced during 1976-80, they had to find 21 billion
barrels. This figure exceeds estimated discoveries during
this time by almost 50 percent.
The oil industry in the Soviet Union is burdened with
additional problems. According to Arthur A. Meyerhoff, a
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Tulsa based consultant who specializes in Soviet oil production
,
the technology used is nearly thirty years behind their American
counterparts. Their techniques optimize short term gains while
minimizing long term production. For example, the Soviets have
claimed that high pressure water injection into wells has in-
creased recoverable oil to the 50 percent level. The average
recovery rate of U.S. wells (only 32-33 percent) despite great
improvements in technology and equipment in recent years seems
to indicate the Soviets are overly optimistic. Water flooding
techniques have been used since the initiation of production
in most USSR fields. The long term effect appears to be that
the large volumes of water that have been injected at high
pressure damaged reservoirs. Water injection yields high
production rates in the early years of an oil field. As the
field gets older, though, injected water breaks through the
oil bearing rock into the producing wells. When this occurs,
new wells must be drilled to locate the oil, or expensive
pumps must be installed to lift the oil and water mixture to
63
the surface.
By Soviet accounts, 50 percent of their 195 5 oil produc-
tion was by water injection. In 1960, they reported 60 per-
cent and more than 80 percent in 197 6 using the water injection
technique. By the mid-1960s, water recovery began to rise
substantially and the use of pumps became necessary. In the
late 1960s, oil output began to drop off in Bashkir and show
signs of decline in other parts of the Urals-Volga. The USSR
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imported 1000 high-capacity electric submersible pumps from
the United States. These pumps stabilized oil production in
the Urals-Volga. The CIA estimates that unless additional
64fluid lifting capacity is obtained output will decline.
The Soviet inventory of submersible pumps as of 1 January 197 5
was said to be 11/950; of these, 8,700 were in service, the
remainder were undergoing repair or were in reserve. The
Soviet pumps are inferior to American pumps in capacity,
reliability and maintainability. The United States has a
maximum output of 30 pumps per month. With competing domestic
demands, the Soviet may be unable to obtain the pumping
capacity required. In Bashkir alone, it will be necessary to
install 470 to 500 pumps per year to maintain output.
Samotlor is already showing signs of water cut. It took
18 years in the Urals-Volga region to reach the 10 percent
water mark. In Samotlor, this amount of water was discovered
in the total fluid produced within three years . The sub-
mersible pumps last up to a year without service in the Urals-
Volga. In Samotlor, however, due to salt and silt pumped in
the fluid, the pumps need to be replaced after only 60 days of
66
operation.
The total impact of these practices on oil recovery before
1974 cannot be fully assessed due to limited data. After 1974
the CIA reports that several prominent Soviet leaders and
reservoir experts admitted that many mistakes were made on




to this recovery method is uncertain. Other errors besides
water injection have compounded the recovery problem. Untreated
water has led to excessive salt formation in well bores.
Organic material in untreated surface water injected in hot oil
reservoirs has caused prolific bacteria growth that reduces
68
rock porosity.
Soviet industrial capacity is unable to produce the quantity
or the quality of pumps needed to maintain oil level production.
Between 1971-76, Soviet orders for Western oil and gas equip-
ment have totaled about 3.1 billion dollars. An additional
4 billion dollars of steel pipe has been bought.
Oil exploration is also hampered by inadequate geophysical
and drilling equipment only partly compensated by imported
Western equipment. The average depth of exploratory drilling
was increased from 2,540 meters in 1970, to an average of 3,180
meters in 1980. At these greater depths and pressures, Soviet
drill bits proved to be inadequate. The USSR manufactures an
estimated 1 million rock bits annually, compared with only
400,000 manufactured in the entire Western world. The quality
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is grossly inferior to those produced in the United States.
Instrumentation and exploratory equipment are largely obsolete.
Seismic recording is often still done on analog tapes which
cannot read beyond 2000 meters. In mid-1977, the Soviets
admitted that the search for oil deposits in West Siberia was






With continued emphasis being placed on development drill-
ing to meet short term oil production goals it is difficult to
see how the Soviets can keep up oil production growth. The
volume of exploratory drilling has stagnated since 1965 while
the wildcat success rate has declined. In 1970, when the oil
ministry drilled 29.53 million feet of hole, 9.29 million feet,
or 31.5 percent was exploratory. By 1975 only 8.97 million
feet of a total of 38.39 million was exploratory. This trend
is continuing. The oil ministry's 1980 results show about
8.66 million feet of exploratory drilling, or 13.3 percent of
the 64.96 million feet of total hole. 72
Without the consideration of an end to Western technological
help, numerous assessments of the Soviet oil balance in 1985
are available. Table 2-12 gives nine different predictions
at this 198 5 time frame, which is the longest span which pre-
dictions can be made with any degree of accuracy. They are
interesting in a number of respects: the U.S. government pre-
dictions of production are below the rest. The U.S. academics
come next with a low scenario of just over 600 million T/Y
while European academic sources are suggesting production
levels up to and exceeding 700 million T/Y. If the past per-
formance of the official Soviet plan is any indication of
future performance then the CIA figures may be the nearest to
fact.
Soviet consumption is also quite difficult to estimate.




Soviet Oil Balance, 1985
(in millions of tons)
Production Consumption Imports Exports Net exports
1. 750 (650-670) (580-580) (100)
2. 655 (605) 545 (515) 100 (90
3. 580 (600) 505 75 1
4. 612-713 467-536 144-157
5. 525 50 150 100
6. 500-550 175-225 2
(50-100)





"To East Europe only.
2soviet and East European imports : figures in parentheses
are Soviet imports inferred by the author.
^Soviet estimates learned in discussions with oil industry
officials.
Sources:
1. Jeremy Russel, The Times , July 27, 1977. Figures in
parentheses are Russell's 1979 estimates.
2. Leslie Dienes in: Leslie Dienes and Theodore Shabad,
"The Soviet Energy System," (John Wiley: Washington, D.C. 1979),
table 53, p. 252, figures in parentheses are low estimates.
3. Robert E. Ebel, "Soviet Oil in the 1980' s" (Washington,
D.C, September 1977). Figure in parentheses is indicated by
a more recent paper by the same author "Energy Demand in the
Soviet Bloc and "the PRC," June 1979.
4. Hebert L. Sawyer, "The Soviet Energy Sector: Problems
and Prospects," Harvard, January 1978 quoted in "Energy Projec-
tions—Oil, Natural Gas and Coal in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern
Europe," Energy Policy, George W. Hoffman, pp. 232-241.
5. Harry G. Trend, "The Key to East European Economic
Development, " Radio Free Europe Research RAD Background Report
93 (Eastern Europe), May 12, 1978, cited in Hoffman loc cit.
6. CIA
7. "Situation et Perspectives du Bilan Energetique des
Pays de L'est," Le Courier des Pays de L'Est, No. 216, March
1978. Median case cited in parentheses in low case.
8. "La Production Petroliere Sovietique a L 1 Horizon 1985,
Approche Regionale, " Centre D' Etudes Prrospectives et D' Infor-
mations Internationales, May 1979.
9. "Energy Supplies and Reserves in the ECE Region: Present
Situation and Perspectives," Economic Commission to Europe,
United Nations, New York 1979, p. 19.
10. Official Soviet 5-year plan target.
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minus net trade. This is a good yard stick for approximate
use; nonetheless, it cannot answer the critical question what
figure is optimum at any particular time, rather than what
the priorities of the planners are.
In a study by Leslie Dienes, he concluded that the optimum
rate of consumption would be 1:1 to economic growth. With
anything less than that, severe economic dislocation would
73
occur. If one assumes a 3H percent growth rate with a
working 1978 apparent oil consumption figure of 421 million
tons, oil consumption for 1985 would be around 535-540 million
tons or about what the CIA predicts production will be. If a
slower 2 percent growth rate occurs then consumption would be
around 500 million tons. A surplus could be anywhere from
74
to 100 million tons conservatively.
To understand what planned output conditions and historic
consumption figures would mean to the Soviet economy, East
European energy consumption for 1985 must be estimated. Fig-
ures generated in a study by Jonathan P. Stern for the Joint
Economic Committee concluded that total Eastern European con-
sumption in 1985 would be from a high of 159 million tons to a
low of 127 million tons. This would mean a deficit over Soviet
exports between 42-59 million tons using rather liberal Soviet
export figures. Further in the report he concluded concern-




"The lack of hard currency earnings potential in Eastern
Europe has meant that those countries have little chance
of purchasing anything other than marginal quantities of
oil on the world market. Current levels of indebted-
ness virtually rule out any possibility of Eastern Europe
being able to borrow funds in the West in order to finance
hard currency oil purchases. East European countries are
therefore looking for some non-commercial terms. From
the standpoint of the producer, these countries are offer-
ing products and expertise inferior to that which can be
purchased in the West and therefore, there needs to be
some non-commercial rationale for oil producers to enter
trade with them." 76
It therefore can be concluded that with optimistic figures the
Soviet Union will be in a difficult situation in 1985 in re-
gards to both Eastern Europe and hard currency earnings. If a
Soviet invasion of Poland occurred this situation would be
greatly intensified and it is not easy to imagine a workable
solution to such a predicament. It could be thus assumed that
the oil production problem alone is a powerful restraint on
Soviet actions.
Conservation and alternate energy sources have been pointed
to by some as a solution to the Soviet energy problem. A closer
look at these areas shows perhaps a bright future in the long
term but only marginal relief can be provided in the short.
By any standards the Soviets possess massive gas reserves.
The proven reserve total stands at some 28 trillion cubic meters
or 1/3 of the world total. Ultimately, recoverable resources
amounting to many times that figure have been identified off-
77
shore, in inaccessible regions and the Far East.
In the twenty-five years up to 1975, the Soviet gas indus-
try proved a great disappointment to the planners who failed
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to see a single goal met. The center of production was moving
into increasingly harsh physical terrain which called for
techniques of production that were more sophisticated than
available. It was not until the late 1970s, with the intro-
duction of large diameter imported pipe and foreign built
compressor stations, that the essentials of greatly increased
gas production became available. Since 197 5 every target has
been exceeded and annual production has topped 535 BCM (billion
cubic metres) in 1980. Predictions of Soviet natural gas pro-
duction in 1985 range from 560 to 7 50 BCM with exports ranging
from 55 to 180 BCMs . The crucial factor for gas is the equip-
ment which the USSR imports from the West in the form of pipe
and compressors
.
If all the excess gas from the Soviet Union was exported
to the Eastern bloc nations, which presently looks unlikely,
there would still be considerable energy deficit by 198 5.
Nevertheless, gas can be considered an important energy
source to both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which should
78increase in consumption much faster than the GNP
.
The Soviet coal industry performance was a significant
disappointment to the Soviets, falling in production for two,
and possibly three consecutive years. The Soviet Union has
prospectively enormous reserves of coal. Figures of around
240 billion tons are commonly expressed, with ultimately re-
coverable figures as high as 6 trillion tons. Nevertheless,
after production rose by a total of just 13 million tons in
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the first two years of the plan (76-78) totals fell to 719
million tons in 1979 and fell again to 716 million tons in
791980; a figure below that which was produced in 1977.
The Soviet coal industry has run into serious problems with
investment, an overload of the transportation industry and a
rapid deterioration of mine conditions, primarily associated
8
with depth and thickness of seams. The Soviet coal produced
was largely of poor grade having a low calorific content. The
prospects for the future are dimmer than previously thought;
new fields that have been discovered east of the Urals are
almost entirely made up of what is known as sub-bituminous
coal with a heat content of a low 4 million kilocalories per
ton. Difficulties arise with this coal because of its ten-
dency to ignite spontaneously and thus it cannot be trans-
ported long distances.
Coal is an accurate representation of the Soviet raw
materials problem as a whole. As with most Soviet natural
resources, the geographic imbalance between centers of con-
sumption and production is acute. With coal the problem is
probably even more major than with other fuels. The Western
high quality deposits principally from the Don basin are
beginning to deplete rapidly. Because of the nature of the
sub-bituminous coal of the east the only economic utilization
of it is through the long distance transmission of power from
generating facilities at the local fields. To this end the
Soviets have demonstrated some success with a 40 billion KWH
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annual rate power line from Ekibastuz to Kumbov. However,
the ultimate goal of 100 billion KWH is still a considerable
way from realization.
Information on the civilian nuclear power program is
sparse. The industry has suffered from many significant prob-
lems concerning technology and equipment of such magnitude
that it would have doomed the American industry if similar
problems had occurred; most notably the bad accident in 1957.
The energy problem in the Soviet has increased the priority
of nuclear power. Nevertheless, nuclear power cannot really
become important until 1990s and probably not until the next
century. The targets for 198 5 call for 50 billion KWH or
2.7 percent of Soviet energy production produced by nuclear
power. By the year 2000 no more than 7.7 percent of Soviet
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energy is expected to come from a nuclear source.
Conservation has been emphasized by Gosplan for the past
four to five years. First high level indication of the success
of such measures was during the November 1978 plenum where
Brezhnev admitted that after a spending of 5 billion rubles
on conservation efforts no important energy saving had been
8 3
made. In a study done by Leslie Dienes published in June
1981, concluded that the Soviet system is less able than west-
ern nations to check the increase of energy demand by decoupling
84it from economic growth. He pointed that irregardless of
intense conservation efforts in the late seventies, on an
average, the rise of gross energy demand and that of growth
was at best one to one, and probably worse.
54

A CIA study indicated that the substitution of fuels had
resulted in some oil savings. However, 54 percent of Soviet
oil is consumed in internal combustion engines and large scale
conversion can come only very slowly.
With only one vehicle for 40 inhabitants, compared with
more than one for every two inhabitants in the United States
,
gasoline consumption is proving to be a difficult area to
economize. The other significant segments of Soviet consump-
tion include heat production, electricity generation and fuel
transport which have been extremely reluctant to respond to
campaigns for conservation. To realize large gains in energy
reduction in these areas would require significant capital and
time, both of these commodities- in short supply.
On the balance, the Soviet Union will be a net exporter of
energy for the foreseeable future. A great part of its per-
formance rests on the Soviet Union's access to Western tech-
nology and equipment. The most favorable scenario for Soviet
energy production is portrayed on the following page. Notable
is the contraction of the Soviet energy surplus by 16-38 million
tons of standard fuel during the period. Another notable fea-
ture is the large increase of the percent of natural gas in
the balance. As Dienes suggests, "Natural gas is the ace in
the Soviet energy plans and provides a critical cushion for
the uncertainties faced by planners with respect to other
8 6
sources of supply."
The Soviet energy picture for domestic consumption is
bright and will be able to maintain a net energy export in
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881985 of 230-250 million tons of standard fuel. Domestic
consumption is only part of the picture, however. The Soviet
Union still must also supply other countries, mostly Eastern
Europe, Vietnam and Cuba if their economic life is to be
prolonged. Even with complete Soviet Union support these
countries will still require between 42 to 59 million tons of
additional oil per year by 1985 and it would mean the total
loss of oil as a hard currency earner for the Soviet Union.
If the Eastern European countries are unable to enter the
world oil market the question then arises at what level may
economic growth rates fall before provoking social unrest.
This question could become pertinent much sooner if the Soviets
were to invade Poland.
TABLE 2-13 87
Soviet Energy Balance 1980-85
1980 1985
Production Consumption Surplus Production Consumption Surplus
Oil 603(862.3) 473(676.4) 130(185.9) 650(928.5) 550(786.5) 100(143.0)
605(865.2) 520(743.6) 85(121.6)
Gas 436(517.7) 380(452.2) 55(65.5) 610(725.9) 535(636.7) 75(89.2)
Coal 716(501.2) 691(483.7) 25(17.5) 800(560.0) 770(539.0) 30(21.0)
Total (1,881.2) (1,612.3) (268.9) (2,215.4) 2 (1,962.2) 2 (253.2)
(2,151.1) 3 (1,919.3) 3
Oil and coal in million tons, gas in billion cubic meters. Figures in
parentheses are standard fuel equivalent converted at: Oil, 1 ton = 1.43
tonnage of standard fuel equivalent; gas 1 billion cubic meter = 1.19 ton-









Agriculture is the weakest and least productive sector of
the Soviet economy with a performance characterized by low labor
productivity and extremely high cost of production. Moreover,
despite gains in agricultural growth, which was overall greater
than that of the United States for a period of nearly three
decades, the U.S.S.R. has failed to produce the quantity and
89quality of products necessary to meet domestic demand. As a
result, the Soviet Union has become one of the world's major
importers of farm products. During the mid-1970s, grain im-
ports by the Soviet Union averaged 9 million tons a year; by
the end of the decade, they had climbed to some 20 million tons
a year. The Soviet planned imports for 1980 consisted of 34
million tons - the largest amount in the history of any
90
country. It is quite apparent that the Soviet Union would be
severely affected by any effective embargo of agricultural goods
initiated by the West for a Soviet invasion of Poland.
The Soviet agricultural industry presents one of the major
paradoxes of the Soviet planning system and exposes some of the
contradictions of the Soviet economy in general. On the one
hand, total direct farm investment in the Soviet Union has run
6.3 times the value of investment in the United States for the
past decade. On the other agricultural productivity growth has
been extremely erratic, declining .4 percent during the 1971-75
91 .....time period. This widening gap in productivity is surprising
in light of the enormous agricultural investment that the U.S.S.R,
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continues to pump into the area. In 1977 , for example, Soviet
farm investment was equivalent to about $7 8 billion compared
with U.S. investment of roughly $10.5 billion. Nevertheless,
labor productivity, the value of farm output per man-day in
the U.S.S.R., fell from roughly 7 percent of the U.S. level in
92the mid-1960s to 5% percent in the mid-1970s. Overall, the
agricultural sector receives more than one-fourth of the Soviet
Union's investment resources, employs one- fourth of the labor
93force, but only produces one-sixth of the GNP.
The Soviet agricultural problem can be distilled into two
distinct parts, with each compounding the other. The Soviets
have severe environmental limitations, climatically comparable
to the Prairie Provinces of Canada, and a system of management
and production that is close to being the worst imaginable.
Agriculture in the U.S.S.R. is handicapped by low rainfall and
a short growing season, but it still has more crop land than
any other country. Furthermore, in a study completed by Dr.
Johnson, at the University of Chicago, he found that the
characteristic climate conditions in nine-tenths of the Soviet
grain area roughly correspond with those selected locations
in six states and the three Prairie Provinces of Canada —
North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Montana, Wyoming, Minnesota,
Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Manitoba. The only real difference
is that of precipitation. In the North American continent,
the areas similar in climate and soil to Soviet farm land re-
ceive a very large proportion of annual precipitation during
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the growing season. In many of the major Soviet grain grow-
ing areas, less than half the annual precipitation occurs
94during this season.
Climate might explain why the Soviet Union is not the
leading food exporter, but it is not a sufficient total explana-
tion of why it cannot feed its domestic population. Japan,
for example, is also poorly endowed with agricultural resources,
yet with 3 million hectares of land in grain, it manages to
satisfy the needs of its 110 million people for rice, and has
some left over for export. The Soviet Union, with 260 million
people, has 122 million hectares in grain. Put another way,
in the Soviet Union one acre of farm land is unable to feed
two people, while in Japan more than 36 people are fed by an
equal area.
The history of Soviet agriculture prior to Khrushchev was
written in blood. Agriculture policy was a blend of extreme
pressure, impatience, of stubborn optimism, and of willful
ignorance. By the time of Stalin's death the condition of
agriculture was deplorable. The prevalent belief being that
agriculture could be set in the right direction without a
major restructuring, or a permanent increase in agriculture's
9 6
share of the investment budget. Khruschev shared this view,
but unlike Stalin, Khruschev had a passionate interest in
agriculture. Over the years there was little he did not try,
except probably what was truly needed. Many of the traits
Khrushchev is remembered best for come from his endless schemes
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for the farm land: his passion for the spectacular gamble,
his constant and frantic reorganizations, his lust for miracle
crops and his finally fatal habit of taking the turns in the
97
weather as a vindication of his policies.
Khrushchev's effort to increase agricultural production
was aimed at several fronts, including:
(1) Programs for rapid expansion of crop areas;
(2) Partial decentralization of planning and management;
(3) Higher prices and other measures to provide peasant
incentives; and
9 8
(4) Modest increases of production capital.
The opening of the "virgin lands'* east of the Volga River
in Siberia and Kazakhstan resulted in an increase of total
sown areas of more than a fifth from 195 3-19 56. The average
output of these semi arid- farm lands was 13.6 million tons
with an area peaking in the early 1960s of 63 million hectares
A major result of this expansion of farm land was a shift to
corn and livestock in the traditional farm areas, while the
virgin lands, not well suited for corn production, picked up
99the slack with grain production.
The area of expansion required considerable increases of
investment and drew heavily on the rural labor force. As
investment increased for the virgin lands much of the rest of
Soviet agriculture became investment starved, especially the
non-black-earth zone in the northern half of the European
U.S.S.R. The virgin lands themselves were poorly managed.
The policies of the Kremlin drove soil fertility steadily
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downward, leading eventually to the disastrous crop failure
of 1963. Constant pressure from above to maintain increasingly
longer areas under cultivation led to weed problems, dust
storms reaching as far as European Russia and declining yields.
Farm labor, discouraged by poor crop output migrated back
to European Russia in great numbers. New arrivals, attracted
at high cost, were trained in farming techniques ill suited to
the dry soils of the virgin lands. Fedor Morgum, now First
Secretary of the CPSU's Poltaca Obkom, was head of the agri-
culture for the entire Tselinryy Kray in the virgin lands.
Morgum claimed the poor results of Khrushchev's programs came
from short-sightedness, agronomic stupidity, and willful dis-
regard of facts due to the relentless political pressure of
100Moscow
The virgin lands, certainly not a shining success, never-
theless contributed substantially to the national food supply.
The program had a one-time growth impact, however, which
reached its major limits in the first few years, and it did
not solve the basic problem of low productivity.
Food prices were increased in the late 1950s to improve
farmer incentives. However, the standard of living never
reached that of the urban dwellers and farm price increases
were withheld again until 1962. On state farms, the total
average profit became increasingly negative from 1958 through
19 63. At the same time these negative agriculture traits
were aggravated by a campaign against the private sector which
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resulted in substantial reduction in land and livestock hold-
ings and consequently, farmer incomes.
Investment also fell off with the completion of the virgin
land campaign. Investments in collective farms actually de-
clined and did not exceed 1958 levels until 1964. The invest-
ment which was provided apparently went into livestock holdings
and more long-term land improvement programs . Growth in shorter
term productive inputs, such as fertilizer, was quite moderate
until 1963.
The programs of Khrushchev initially showed success and
brought production to a new level. The lack of price increases
and continued investment stopped farm output from continued
rising. Few gains were made between 1959-63; in fact, average
output was only 3 percent above the peak level of 1958.
The last and fatal experiments under Khruschev concerned
administrative reorganization, and campaigns. Khrushchev
ordered a program to plow up fallow and grass lands and plant
them with supposedly more productive crops. A record low fallow
area coincided with extremely dry weather in 1963 to produce a
major crop failure. Cattle and hogs were distress slaughtered
and large grain imports were purchased from the West. In 1964,
Khrushchev was ousted.
The first major economic program of the post-Khrushchev
leadership was in agriculture. Leonid Brezhnev, General Secre-
tary of the Communist Party, led a remarkable shift of policy
and resources. The March 1965 plenum on agriculture and the
23rd Party Congress in early 1966 included these reforms:
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(1) Reduced planned goals on State purchases of grains and
livestock products with amounts fixed through 1970;
(2) Increased State purchase prices to collective and State
farms on grains and meat, which followed a previously announced
increase on milk prices;
(3) Premiums on prices of several commodities, including
a 50 percent bonus on above-plan sales of grain, which later
was followed by a 100 percent bonus to collective farms on
above-average sales of sunflower seeds and a 50 percent bonus
on above-average sales of cotton;
(4) A considerable rise in the level of investments into
agriculture, with particular emphasis on stepped-up deliveries
of machinery;
(5) Altered tax procedures to eliminate double taxation of
collective farm labor payments;
(6) Cancellation of long-term debts of weak collectives;
(7) Elimination of price discrimination between rural and
urban areas on consumer goods;
(8) A planned doubling in supplies of mineral fertilizers
used in agriculture by 1970 - but this was less than promised
previously by Khrushchev;
(9) A comprehensive land improvement program - irrigation,
drainage, liming - which subsequently was discussed in greater
detail at a special plenum of the Communist Party Central Com-
mittee in May 1966, but which largely was already envisaged
in the investment goals previously announced;
63

(10) Stricter procurement contracts, specifying fines for
failure to meet them, with especially severe penalties on
procurement organizations which fail to accept delivery of
perishable commodities;
(11) A program to greatly improve electriciation in rural
areas;
(12) Emphasis on the role of specialists and scientific
farming principles, apparently in contrast to the Party and
administrative bureaucracy; and
(13) A directive to improve housing and public amenities
, 102in rural areas.
Table 2-14 shows the sharp turn around of investment under
Brezhnev's leadership. Further efforts of Brezhnev toward
agriculture can be characterized primarily by higher prices
and incomes, greater leeway and certainty of farms and farmers
in their planning, and greater use of profits and cash incen-
tives to stimulate agricultural performance. Gross agricul-
tural output during 1966-70 gained 21 percent and grain
production was up 29 percent. Livestock performance was im-
proved; meat and milk output was up 25 percent. These gains
far exceeded performance during the Khrushchev years . Some
of the performance, no doubt can be attributed to the more
favorable weather during 1966-70.
For the 1970s, the fundamental element of Soviet agricul-
tural goals was a strong commitment to a rapid increase of
livestock production and thereby to satisfy more fully the
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commitment included the use of imports of grain to help cover
shortfalls in livestock output and to the uncharacteristic
acceptance of external debts to make possible such imports.
Favorable pre-conditions for the livestock program were
established by increased prices on poultry and livestock in
the 1969-1970 time frame. Key price changes included (1)
Establishment of 50-percent premiums on above-plan sales of
livestock products; (2) the fixing of livestock prices at pre-
mium levels; (3) establishment of additional price premiums
of 35 to 50 percent on young cattle fattened beyond specific
weights; (4) price increases of 20 percent on milk and cream;
and (5) price increases of 20 to 30 percent on several grades
104
of wool, as well as increases on sheep and goats.
The critical element of the livestock program was the need
to expand feed production. The plan called for a 40 percent
jump in feed supplies from 1970-1975. Foremost among the
requirements to expand feed was the need to increase fertilizer
deliveries. Fertilizer deliveries jumped 69 percent from 1965
to 1970 and another 65 percent from 1970-1975.
Despite the increases in fertilizer and a massive program
of irrigation and drainage, the 1970s production of feed were
far more ambitious than could be attained in the course of a
few years. The weak link in the livestock program turned out
to be feed supply. Though feed supplies rose dramatically in
the 1970s, as shown in Table 2-15, they did not provide enough
even in good weather years, and there was a considerably
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Prior to 1971 the U.S.S.R. had imported grain in relatively
small quantities, except following the poor 1963 and 1965 crops
Imports of grain began to rise in 1971 leading to massive im-
ports of more than 20 million tons in 1972. Average imports
for 1971-75 reached 15 million tons per year, exceeding 20
million tons in 1975. Averaging 20 million tons for 1975-80
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culminating with 34 million tons in 1980.
When looking at overall growth. figures, Soviet agriculture
shows impressive performance. However, when productivity is
compared with other industrial countries, most notably the
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The problems that face Soviet agriculture that the leader-
ship has yet been unable to solve are similar to the problems
of the Soviet economy as a whole. Centrally planned economies
like the Soviet Union do not lack for well thought out and
advisable initiatives. Where system failings become apparent
is in the implementation of these plans in a timely and work-
able manner. Enormous bureaucracies, by their very nature,
hinder innovation, are inefficient and slow moving, and are
extremely reluctant to share power. The Soviet bureaucracy is
considerably more prone to these problems.
Many new construction projects are ill planned, the tech-
nical requirements for agriculture often are poorly estimated,
and hence, as Brezhnev noted in July 1979, more material funds
are used than planned. Poor design and inadequate maintenance
leads to retirement rates of farm machinery at an incredible
pace. Table 2-17 shows that some farm equipment is scrapped
at nearly 20 percent per year, which is the highest among the
world industrial countries.
Continued limited control of farm managers has led to
severe lags in the introduction of modern crop varities , in
the adoption of suitable methods of applying fertilizer and
other chemicals, and in the selection of suitable methods of
proper tillage and harvesting practices. Farm chairmen con-
stantly complain of interference. Repeatedly the managers
state that they have been given precise plans for sowing
particular areas, even if these plans contradict existing crop
69

<-tmvoa\vD m a ui at
a^ea BuTddT^os
^ d j j ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ » • OS (U c
pH Z Z Z h u M WHO)
O u-113 • M Cfl 4) O i*i —4->OiO'4-iM03.GMr'101
c c i .* <u (up*
IU-H . C O O 'O Qih 91
<r en r-- <r o en o 91 a 01 \o o >-o m o 3 i£ o o h
S3TJ9ATTSO I1 O 3) N «1 ID (N * lO 1/1 O r» CH>JGp404JtAmlM
,. f " p-l pi pH IN CM CN IN IN <N IN IN <N •-1 > fl JJO 3 <3" C
01 p* G T3 <9
h iC CO (M <£ (O O iS (N H T3 -Q £ 3 u pH <o a •«
^ vO en vD fi P-- <*i m cm «T O 4) 9H Q II M II OX
SOX.XO"tUaAUT OMr-ltNOiro (Nflrrin 13 "O f» O D> C O 4)03
rH rH F-4 p* pH pH p^ p* pH pH Z Z > 3 M -H U V *> C
•plO+'«N ,T3P-pttlJlfl73^3 3 r* -H .u G •*
- Ophoiu>ooo
— <* miijj •OHsaocHi;
n io * co n ai co p~ m 4> .a no in g -h m
1) at
M >
uj w nw -w • * v -*j i •* * *• —j > -" --• **
"O 33BW 6uxddB.X0S • • -H 1( H 44 >w
flj iH r-l r-l fH i-4 fH pH p-I Z Z Z Z <0 -H CJ 4) .C -Pt *l3™ C U) • CD (0 C « -HOlJ 0>lll lS'4HQ'H >fi4
.C ? >ijc>oi>3ai-uo3 HUN
** 2 »>••»«•M.»u mininvococn p- 01 z Z Z z -hs.Q<h<mKi-<-**ojso
«
-w H -h nj > > fiOS CJ20>0"OOUXJ<
a> 5 •Hou-Hoic^caaio
iB* ami^HMi uvni1 aigCflui-Hw a. in
K SSTJOIUSAUT r^mtNrorOkO m CO O < < < Di 'HJIIilUJIllBH
• "* * ntontnmo m m <g> z Z Z cuigc:s«;4^a«
Ol nJOH03.fi-4J<Ja)Cm .C 01 <fl Z -4J u>H 2 * U 0) -HTT -p4 4> » » J*QiJ! 'j in in m d (N ai ^ u-4 TJ u) c 4) -U • -Ha.2 ... a -h c tn -wmc-oc
in 7n snBH BuTddeaoc < m r» pn4 T ^o m m m < < < j:-h(33.—tjscjiujj




C S3Ti3ATT3a * P- 1^ l~ r» CO r»0DOiefi<Ti Z -WkjOOX:(Or. • l E 3J fl u <u 3 -h h r» o •
tn H O > * U < BCBo
en oi 2 « '.' S i ^ k oi." a "-h
H r, <0100!NfO iHrrmC0< rt •H£HU)J<l(OJfi'n
M >< SST^OIUaAUI Z'HT'a'TT •<* * *T f Z Z MHO N 4t<8
l> >U0r^U3CinUI
or'-rt- * -H.u-iiacowaijcia)^
-H O^P»0>-^ T'J r-(t/)-HT3-H34)EQ<M
aiai =T . -> •4)<u-HCU-u-3 |«4JH Q m 34-BH DUTddBJOS < n M rt 51 O -Hr><<<j:< < T3-U « « • U H O ^ H
j3 S z n(n nhin <N^zzz z >g 41 aaiumms
<& - 7, uv40»ajMQ40ip
6<- 3 -H-rtxsoiac^a,
3CMCQC--4-H ^C"«
o n sax^aATTaa cn^'H-^ocri o or- <t < < aia,uiuiT3oai3fl
4J K b - rH(N(N<N(N^ (N-^>HZZ Z 0,-H3Hfl 4J-.Cu 4)i84)^MW»W(Bfi
ij j. mr»a!mcn.H oi i/l ifl _
__
0"-h4)W3Q<c/J000
r .4)S JJM£U)UOiOC34)>2 nju-uMCiStQJilaio
a H wwa)Mnjjc:ci4M^ qirH(Nn^(-i » CO n » 3<*1 "w 4) N +J 41
saxJo^uaAUT ^^r^iniar- in\oiN<<s < tn >i u o oj3 u cu
o ai oi oi ai oi encnozz z cmoim e<.»4J
>, . •-iii'a'a < -uQ rao<N
M *H — - -:~; J 'J -X)
I) a, -H Jl -H ^ 1) > H N
-i .* MU1334JO^COG
oS ,•,, .... «i2uiow«ioioi:oi
<9 e a^BH BUTddBJOS NinHNON (Nrnnin< < r- 0<rH-HOG»
jg i rtr^^-^^-H rtrtHrtZ Z 4IJ3I»J<CJ 241-HOi
^ £Oi-iccQaa*jfi
^•y (Vi -h r» a fl <0 w •'tflS G01>UO)1 .U«IBMri p-i 4» 3 m a > -H
3 TCTl(»l<Nn(N O CO H H IN CO -4) '/)01vO<N41UlO
+j - sax^aATTsa si oi ai co a oi 01 01 o h h o m>oj s.«cn o«mpH^ " pHrHr^ H fl«£>l'HOI w 'X4la^j o£4jhdh an oiOS », O 3 I p. QiDH
•Hrn »CiJHC001» £b
u w o ci oi iB co ^ oomd jiuoflo-i^ffl^*1
oi saxjciuaAUT in<Nmininr» in co co oi < < j34) e xinoimo >m
rt Ul if * ID lO iD lO lO l£ lO Z Z *JH73-r-t4) •—t I fl O>4IX»P»0JGiMOtnOT3^0Gr»(flfl4JOWTjMC'HilJOlS fi
o a n n h »a»
dP • en 9) Q< H4J u
J n 10 H ci n r»10P- S — .DU1-OM4IGM
a-iBH BuxddBJOS ... -h&h. c -><n o h 41 »
(N N H IN n n <Nm(Nrt:< < c unoco-^HOOi
rt -I H H H H p-*rHp4ZZ Z G G-rt-lr- HJM
-h .41 uoifljjuaico
2 oinu'Jirtjr-i-HMaiQjin2 41 fl U M -H — -p1 01j 41 41 u u iJ a, 111 m
7; rpinmncoo n 01 in h <r o ><Q< 4JO(,~-u)4)>inoi
s saxjaATTao oipHpitNq-r* n i« 14 r> m co at m w > 41 n fi2 L rs a n n n n nmrpinn 1*1 £ 41 o 4) 10 01 > m-iui-h
!* 4J£O>flpHMG04IW
6:1 *JpHMWOO-H
u <rs 6 -H 3i*J ij0'"OJGM>~J-»Git>K
COI*-ifl<NCOP~ O lO M IN 1M0-J lajJinfl-HOJI
•TP'^iNCOvO f^moiO GGinuiiNS-UO*
S3TJOIUSAUT r» 01 O h h n ^(n^fl> d oi'H I -h I u S OiH
HHIVINrKN INMHf* Z Z HJH4I-U4I-I(N03pH>M4J
-
-J J -I ri QtOflt
G ulGflyCO-pH o
(TJ 41 -H M HjG-.iaotoi
p* -n 01 T3 ^ O U£ CW
0< M4IOiG<w p.3*J-p<0OilCIOIIOiu T3OH in4) 041-U-H O HH h Id 41
r»Oi r» o« COO1 C4)Q4ai(nc^3r»OG'
I it} 1 « I* iljGa.^^CTJ UOIH (Ih
i£ ij^tr^mq-'n pH mvOi^cocji vo m >4Jioyooco-Hp^ u H
vo 4)r~r»r.r-.r- p- 4ir-f~P-P~ p- 41 C M33Mr~M T3MI
01 > 01 oi 01 01 01 01 >cJioiaioi ai > wjjywMfloioiGGaivO
^ iB^l^rH^^ _i « H H H H -4 10 -4 Dlll4J4JZHi(H<Cl|H
70

rotation schemes. Some of the produce not included in the
plan cannot be disposed of because the procurement organiza-
tions refuse to accept it. Little financial autonomy is
allowed, leading to the acquisition of unwanted deliveries of
unsuitable equipment.
Economics of scale is a further problem of Soviet agricul-
ture, especially in the livestock complexes. Table 2-18 suggests
the immense size of Soviet "producer's cooperatives." Some
Soviet experts have argued for smaller farms. However, others
feel the problems of such a move would outnumber the benefits
.
The Soviet leadership has transformed the inefficient
labor-intensive, crop producing agricultural sector of the past
into a labor-intensive, capital-intensive industry at enormous
expense and less rewards than the Soviets had expected. Never-
theless, the overall strategy for continued growth appears to
rest on reclamation, chemicalization, and mechanization.
Special attention is being directed to so-called zones of
guaranteed moisture, such as the Russian Nonchernozem Zone.
The prospects for future food self sufficiency center on
the Soviet leadership's ability to promote break-throughs in
agrotechnology that will support greater grain output as well
as efficiencies in production and continued ability to expend
growing amounts of capital. Recent performance shows only
limited success on both counts. Capital investment has begun
to slow down and in some areas actually decline. Farm receipts













Gross receipts per farm
(1973 prices)
United






$ 34,7303 . $777, 402 4 $634, 545 4
Although it would be more meaningful to provide a distribution by size,
comparable data for each country are not available. Similarly, data for an
overall average of small private holdings of Soviet households are not
available
.
2For comparison purposes, the changing structure and wide diversity of
U.S. agriculture complicate the problem of defining an "average U.S. farm."
The proliferation of integrated operations, and the trends toward special-
ization and increased capitalization of U.S. agriculture have created vast
differences among farms in terms of physical size, asset values, and
marketings. For instance in 1977, farms with sales of $200,000 or more,
although accounting for only 2 percent of all farms, had more than 35 per-
cent of total cash receipts. Correspondingly, farms with sales of less
than $20,000, accounted for only 10 percent of total cash receipts while
comprising 70 percent of all farms. A large proportion of these farm
operators relied on "off farm" sources of income to supplement farm
income
.
^Gross receipts from farm marketings, not including Government pay-
ments or value of products consumed in farm households.
^Gross receipts from marketings by state and collective farms. For
1977, only gross output values are available. These were reduced by using
the average ratio of gross sales to gross production for 1966-70, the most
recent years for which both series are available. The constancy of the
ratio for those years (55 to 56 percent) provides some assurance that the
degree of error in the above estimates is low. Ruble values were convert-
ed to dollars using the ruble/dollar ratio derived by inflating 1977 USSR
total farm output valued in 1968 rubles and 1957-59 dollars to 1973 ruble
and dollar prices.
Sources: U.S. data from Agricultural Statistics 1978 and Farm Income
Statistics, ESCS, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Stat. Bui. No. 609, p.
55. U.S.S.R. data calculated from statistics in Narodnoye khozyaystvo
S.S.R. v 1977 godu, Moscow, 1978, pp. 271 and 288 (hereafter Narkhoz and
the appropriate year) . Sales as a share of gross ruble output from
Sel'skoye khozyaistvo S. S.S.R. , Moscow, 1971, pp. 44, 52.
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Fertilizer was also down 3 percent, while overall investment
in agriculture grew just 2 percent in 1979 from 4 percent in
1978 and 10 percent in 1971-75. 112
Consequently, the future of Soviet agriculture looks very
much like the past, a mixture of success and failure. The
current plans have had some success in raising the general
level of agricultural production. Unless radical organiza-
tional changes are instituted or increased levels of invest-
ment are expended, however, continued progress is likely to
be harder and less effective than past efforts. The slower
growth of capital investment places more emphasis on the ef-
ficient use of the resources, an area in which the present
regime has largely failed. The Brezhnev leadership has failed
to stop or even dampen the year-to-year fluctuations in output.
This scenario seems likely to continue. In some years the
supply of grain will be nearly sufficient for livestock herds.
In most years it will be grossly inefficient to the extent
that the Soviets persist in their commitments to the consumer,
and thus grain will have to be imported. In the upcoming
years, greater and greater resources will be needed to keep
consumers adequately supplied with agricultural commodities.
The willingness of Soviet citizens to accept reductions
in foodstuffs can only be guessed at. For the past few years,
however, reports have filtered out of the Soviet Union of
unrest and labor protests. There has been reports of a walkout
at the giant automotive manufacturing complexes at Burki and
Togliatti in the Volga Basin involving large numbers of workers
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Work stoppages are said to have occurred at a tractor factor
in the Ural Mountain City of Chelyabinsk, and a shutdown of
the giant Kolmy River truck plant in Noberezhnite . In every
instance, the reason was said to be a growing dissatisfaction
113
over supplies of food.
If the Soviets invade Poland, the flow of grain imports
could be cut off completely. A more probable affect would be
a sharp reduction of grain from NATO countries, with only
partial compensatory supplies from other grain exporting
nations. This would result in higher grain prices or a greatly
reduced rate, at the minimum. Such a reduction in feed sup-
plies would force distress slaughtering of livestock with a
significant reduction in the meat supply. Considering the
Polish problem was started to a large degree due to high meat
prices, the Soviet leaders must keep this in mind when con-
templating any action against Poland.
The agricultural prospects in the Soviet Union are only
good if they continue to have the hard currency to buy Western
grain, and the Western market remains open to them. A Polish
invasion would have an effect on their ability to earn hard
currency and buy grain. The resulting consequence of this on
their own domestic stability is difficult to foresee. The
Soviet system has many controls to stop labor outbursts, prob-
ably greater than any country in the world. Nevertheless,
increased worker dissatisfaction can only have a negative
effect on an already weak economy.
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D. THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT
There seems to be considerable agreement among American
analysts, both governmental and private, that the Soviet economy
will experience a rapid deceleration of growth in the 1980s.
The causes of this, as previously discussed, are a growing
labor shortage, continued and increasing energy problems, and
an inefficient and costly agricultural system. However, the
most significant problem of the Soviet economy is its basic
organization. The Kremlin planner is faced with an economy
that is manned by one of the world's most inefficient work
forces, organized in a way that shortages and shoddy workman-
ship are the norm, and where the growth is, to a very large
extent, the result of capital investment and labor, rather than
productivity gains.
The so-called Soviet-type economy's growth momentum has
been flagging. Policies and procedures that worked adequately
in the 1950s and 1960s have yielded diminishing returns in the
1970s and now appear to face failure in the 1980s. The input
increases that formerly underlay output growth are no longer
available at the required level. The answer to the socialist
dilemma seems to be: 1) undertake the necessary measures to
increase productivity; 2) secure external financing; and 3)
reconcile the country to lower growth rates and possible eco-
nomic stagnation.
The Soviet leadership faced with sharply increased pres-
sures to change, have attempted to "muddle" their way through
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by incremental movement concerning the first two solutions
which have resulted in the third. A large group of Soviet
economists and virtually all Western specialists agree that
small scale tinkering can no longer suffice and what needs to
be done is radical system changes and continued use of Western
capital and technology.
Major economic reform in the Soviet Union would be extremely
difficult in the most favorable of circumstances. If the West-
ern answer to a Soviet invasion of Poland was a cut-off of
capital, and technology, such reform could trigger a profoundly
destabilizing chain reaction that could undermine the political
leadership in a fundamental manner.
When comparing the Soviet economic growth formula with that
of the Western countries, the most distinctive feature of Soviet
economic development is the emphasis on high rates of invest-
ment, in addition to labor as the fuel for growth. This type
of development is often referred to as extensive. The Soviet
Union since 19 50 has relied on capital stock as 45 percent of
the contribution to growth, compared to 27 percent in Japan,
18 percent in the industrial economies of northwestern Europe
114
and 25 percent in the United States. Investment growth has
been at such a rate that the Soviet Union is virtually the
only major country in which over the long run, the quantity of
capital has grown more rapidly than the GNP . The USSR capital
expanded by 7.4 percent yearly during 1928-66 while the GNP
grew 5.5 percent. In contrast, the United States' annual rate
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of capital growth between 19 29-57 was 1 percent while GNP
, 115grew at 3.0 percent.
The problem of relying on capital and labor for major
economic growth concerns the high cost of such a formula, and
the continued necessity of a larger share of investment to
maintain equivalent growth. The rate of investment has in-
creased in the USSR since World War II. However, it has not
increased sufficiently to continue the high GNP growth rate.
In the period of 1951-60, investment going to capital stock
expanded by 9.4 percent annually. From 1960-70, the rate in-
crease slowed to 8.1 percent; from 1971-75 it further declined
to 7 . 9 percent, while the last Five Year Plan the growth rate
declined to less than 6 percent. Nevertheless, the Soviets
still relied heavily on capital for growth and was the least
reliant on productivity of any of the major economies. The
reduction of investment growth is thereby considered one of
the major reasons for the decline of GNP growth.
Uncharacteristically the Soviets departed from previous
plans by projecting a low investment growth rate of about 3
percent per year for the near term. The investment input
stringency is caused not so much because of any change in basic
philosophy, but rather the inability of the economy to satisfy
the mounting claims of consumers, producers, and the armed
forces with a slower expanding total output. With a forced
less reliance on investment, greater stress must be placed on
efficiency to produce the growth results projected. Hence
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the emphasis which has appeared repeatedly in recent Brezhnev
speeches on improving the return on investment. Implementation
of investment plans remains extremely inefficient, with gesta-
tion periods often grossly excessive, and a strong tendency to
escalation of costs.
The slowdown in investment reflects the Soviet's inability
to divert additional segments of their GNP away from consump-
tion or the military. In 1980 investment annual output com-
prised 28 percent of the GNP compared with just 16 percent in
the United States. The 1976-80 plan called for a 1.4 produc-
tivity growth annually, while actual productivity declined 0.8
percent. (Refer to table 2-19)
Table 2-19 117
USSR: GROWTH OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT FACTOR INPUTS AND FACTOR
PRODUCTIVITY
Average Annual Percentage Change
1961-70 1971-75 1976-77 1976-80 Plan Actual
GNP 5.2 3.8 4.1 5.0 3.1
Factor Inputs 4.3 4.2 3.6 3.5 3.6
Man-hours 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.3
Capital 8.1 7.9 7.2 6.5 7.0
Land 0.1 0.8 -0.1 0.5
Factor
Productivity 0.9 -0.4 0.5 1.4 -0.8
The Soviet Union's inability to increase productivity is
primarily due to system inefficiencies and a slow rate of tech-
nological progress. Although a major industrial power, the
USSR continues to lag far behind in technology development and

implementation. Except in military production, where the best
workers, managers and scientists in the Soviet system are
assigned, Soviet manufactured products are generally poor in
quality and often technologically inferior. Because of this,
as well as the inability to provide spare parts, and services,
the Soviet exports are almost entirely made up of raw, semi-
processed materials and military hardware, a trade pattern
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unique among industrial nations.
The Soviets have, in an attempt at remaining current, in-
stituted a policy of massive West-East technology transfers.
In a recent report by the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, entitled "Technology Transfer Between
East and West," written by Eugene Zuleski and Helgard Wienert,
it found that 49% of Soviet imports, on the average, were
technology-intensive products. This is a rise of 3 percent
from 1976-77. The major methods of technology transfers are
cooperative research and development programs, turnkey arrange-
ments, licensing contracts and barter. The biggest purchases
in technology transfers are the turnkey arrangements. For
example, deals that were being negotiated in 1978 like the $1
billion to $2 billion contract for pulp and paper plants, a
$3 billion contract for development of gas fields in Siberia,
a $2.8 billion petrochemical project, and a $1 billion to $2
119billion iron and steel complex are of the turnkey type.
"The Soviet Union's preference for turnkey plant pur-
chases" says the report, "is clear from the fact that
90 out of 160 industrial cooperation agreements con-






This type of strategy is for example, a way for the Soviet's
out-of-date chemical industry to leapfrog over the gap in a
short period of years. The problem of such a strategy is that
it makes the Soviet Union increasingly more dependent on West-
ern technology for its economic health.
The Soviet lag in technology is confined not only to
development, but to a slowness in assimilating purchased West-
ern technology as well. In a study done by two British eco-
nomists, Philip Hanson and Malcolm R. Hill, it was concluded
that the Soviets take longer to absorb the technology, that
there was no reduction in lead time with experience, and that
subsequent manning levels tended to be on the high side, while
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output was on the low side.
Once again we see that the problems with domestic genera-
tion of technology are not due to a lack of effort, but to
deficiencies in the system. The Kremlin leaders have long
since recognized the strong relationship between growth and
technology. By 1965, the Soviets' efforts at research con-
sisted of 2000 research institutes employing 2,497,000 people,
including 765,000 professionals, 418,000 semi-professionals
122
and 357,000 research and academic personnel. Soviet phys-
icist Peter Kapitsa noted that the Russians have roughly as
many scientists as the United States but that Soviet output
123is only about one-half that of the Americans.
The Soviets' inability to produce technology is only half
the problem as previously noted. Slow diffusion of technology
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has been the concern of planners for some time. A series of
decrees have endeavored to improve performance of management,
research and development and educational institutions in this
vital area. In view of the slow progress thus far, it seems
unreasonable to count on a break-through over the next several
124years
.
The crux of the Soviet technology transfer and innovation
problem is that the Soviet system of incentives is geared toward
motivating management staffs to fulfill and exceed output plans.
The surest way to avoid failure is by not risking the produc-
tion slow down often associated with new products or processes.
In a market economy, the firm that fails to innovate will lose
sales to those that do. Soviet firms have a guaranteed market,
125therefore, are under no pressure to innovate.
Horror stories abound about the extreme inertia of the
Soviet system. A typical illustration is that of Soviet in-
dustry which developed a system similar to our "zero defects"
organization used in the U.S. aero-space industry. It took
nearly 10 years for the innovative method to work its way up
to the national level and to the initiation of a plan for
adoption. A further example concerns a truck factory that
turned out a certain model for 15 years without improving its
deficient engine. The engine was prone to rapid wear and
high repair costs. Though design improvements would have
proved cost efficient, suggestions were rejected by the
management because of initial expenditures. The management
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was more concerned with cost performance indicators than with
»• 126total efficiency.
A thorough reform of the economic system would boost ap-
preciably the efficiency and quality of production over a
period of a few years. Nevertheless, the Kremlin leaders per-
ceive that reform would threaten vested interests and weaken
its political control. The most radical reform conceivable
would be a form of market socialism which includes a larger
role for free enterprise, a system similar to that which the
Chinese are presently proposing. This would both entail com-
promises with ideology and would replace bureaucrats, hence
it will incur resistance. Moreover, the transition to a mar-
ket economy could cause unemployment and severe disruption in
the short run. Most anlaysts consider that unless a serious
economic break down occurs , few changes in planning and or-
127ganization will develop in the 1980s.
For all these reasons, it is easy to understand why one
analyst has concluded:
"... a major economic reform would disturb the estab-
lished balances in both political and economic power.
It would be strongly opposed by the state bureaucracy
whose jobs, careers and political influence would be at
stake, as well as by the party bureaucracy, whose con-
trol over economic decision-making and resource al-
location would be threatened. Faced with uncertain
long-run benefits, probably high short-run costs, and
certain strong opposition, a Soviet leadership of any
foreseeable composition would probably opt against
taking such risks."128
The capital crisis is not only the result of normal system
needs of an extensive economy, but of the unique affects of
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year after year of poor planning. The lopsidedness of the
Soviet economy is one of these unique features. Because the
focus of Soviet development over the past half century has
been on heavy industry, large cumulative deficiencies exist in
the stock of residential capital, urban social overhead capital,
and the facilities required to supply public and private social
services. After 1957 a large effort was instituted for urban
housing construction. Though large in absolute dimensions, it
failed to produce quality and the required quantity of housing
necessary. With the capital situation as tight as it is, urban
housing shortages seem sure to persist.
Soviet growth policies over the last half century have also
given inadequate attention to improvement in water supply,
sanitary facilities and paved roads. There is an enormous and




streets, and sidewalks. The Soviet highway system is shock-
ingly in contrast with the USSR's position as a global power.
All these require large amounts of capital to solve.
In 1979, crude steel production declined 1.6 percent,
chemical production declined 1.2 percent, cement production
declined 3.2 percent while rail traffic stagnated. All these
areas are capital starved, resulting in obsolete, inefficient
plants and a rail system that is over taxed and deteriorating.
Over the long run, transport problems in the USSR are likely




The skyrocketing raw material costs is a new significant
tax on scarce investment capital. Capital costs have been
rising rapidly, particularly in mineral extraction industries
as the result of the declining quality and quantity of easily
accessible raw materials which have in turn required more
reliance on costly and sophisticated recovery techniques. For
example, the heat value of a ton of coal has declined 10 per-
cent in the 1970s while its source of concentration has shifted
eastward. The need to transport raw materials from more distant
locations, where few or no transport facilities exist, has
pushed up capital expenditures dramatically. According to the
Soviet Chief of the Administration of Financing Heavy Industry,
the cost of production of petroleum has increased by 150 per-
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cent since 1965, coal by 120 percent, lumber by 170 percent.
If the productivity problem cannot be quickly overcome, one
solution to the capital investment problem would be increasing
investment by rearranging GNP output priorities. However, such
a policy entails high costs. The GNP is divided roughly into
three sections: consumption occupying 58 percent, investment
28 percent, and military spending 14 percent. In view of these
proportions, consumption seems the most likely candidate for
trimming in favor of investment. A 10 percent increase in
investment would only reduce consumption by 5 percent. The
military, however, would have to be cut 25 percent to obtain
the same gain. The large difference is not all it appears
because resources devoted to the three kinds of production are
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not of the same caliber. Those engaged in military production
are of much higher quality than that of consumer goods. Be-
cause of this fact the cost of building up the Soviet military
has greater impact on the rate of growth than is apparent by
the statistics alone.
The decision to increase the weight of investment involves
considerable domestic concerns. Per capita consumption has
risen greatly since World War II, but its growth is subsiding.
In 19 51-60, it grew at 3.8 percent per year. But during the
period 1971-75, growth has declined to only 2.9 percent. Any
further decrease will diminish the resources available as
worker incentives and possibly create serious unrest among
workers. Last year alone, food shortages have caused protests
in Naberezhniye, Chelny, Chelyabinsk and perhaps other Soviet
cities. Discontent might become linked to other sources of
unrest, such as minority nationality issues and political
dissidence.
The burden of military spending on the Soviet economy has
been quite significant. Military expenditures represent about
14 percent of all output, using more than one-sixth of the
nation's energy, one-sixth of the chemicals, one-fifth of
132
metallurgy, and one-third of all machinery and metal working.
With the possibility of economic stagnation, with a military
where spending continues to grow at a 4-5 percent rate percent
per year, the military is an attractive target for cuts. How-
ever, the decisions taken at the 25th Party Congress indicate
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that reduction will most likely come in the production in con-
sumer goods rather than in the growth of the military. Reduc-
tion in the level of military spending would require a basic
re-evaluation of the Soviet Union's defense posture. To have
an effect of noticeable proportions a much larger share must
be cut out of the military when compared with consumption.
A significant reduction in military output, either in
absolute terms or in the rate of increase, must be accompanied
by the decision to alter its military/political goals. Con-
sidering the amount of effort the Soviets have put into mili-
tary production thus far it is considered unlikely that they
will let priorities shift dramatically. Any policy shift is
likely to be hotly contested by the interests affected. Joseph
S. Berliner states:
"Its (Soviet) economic system is no longer considered a
model for the developing nations , as it was a few decades
ago. Its technology is nowhere in great demand. In the
socialist world it has lost ideological leadership to
China, Eurocommunism, and a variety of local communism.
Its literature, music and culture, in which the nation
was preeminent before the Revolution, have made very
little impact. Hence, those political leaders who
regard it as important that their nation be respected
in the world will be inclined to support the side of
the military." 132
The Soviet economic system has been able to survive its
fundamental deficiencies over the years because of an abundance
of labor and easily reached raw materials. Those days are
coming to a rapid end. Brezhnev in his report to the 26th
Party Congress, made strong pleas for resource conservation.
Moreover, Brezhnev included a tantalizing reference to develop-
ment of liquid synthetic fuels - a radical departure for the
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Soviet Party line which has traditionally down graded such
133projects in favor of increased oil and gas production.
The Soviet Union has shown a rapid and surprising, in its
rapidity, shift from exporter to importer in several raw
134
materials. Most interesting is its purchases of Iranian chrome
135
and cobalt from Zambia.
The Soviet system is becoming ever more dependent on West-
ern economic technology and support to maintain long term
growth. The effects of a cut off would probably be minimal in
13 6
the short term. " However, in the longer run, most importantly
energy production would be affected and the technological gap
with the Soviet Union and the West would continue to widen.
The Kremlin leadership must be aware of this situation and
thus must give it its consideration when planning any action
that might jeopardize Western technology.

III. THE POLISH PROBLEM
To fully understand the cost to the Soviet Union of an
invasion of Poland, and to comprehend the inherent weaknesses
of the "socialistic" economies of Eastern Europe it is necessary
to make a detailed examination of the Polish problem. In
understanding the Polish economic situation it becomes clear
that if the Soviet Union invaded Poland it would place an enor-
mous burden upon itself, solving little and ultimately facing
a similar situation in a very few years as the other Eastern
European economies falter, and finally chancing the possible
short or longer term collapse of its own economic system.
The worth of Poland to the Soviet Union cannot be doubted.
In terms of strategic location, military and economic potential
and size of population, Poland is the key country in the Soviet
bloc. Historically the most often used invasion route to
Russia has been across Poland. The broad Polish plains offer
an accessible, hard to defend path to the heart of the Soviet
Union, while providing the Soviets a similar access to central
and western Europe. As a result of its strategic border with
the U.S.S.R., Poland can be considered the center of the present
day international system in East-Central Europe. Deprived of
access through Poland to East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the
137
Soviet position in those countries would become untenable.
Defense and security interests have always been the official
reasoning for the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe.
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However in recent years this line of justification has lost
much of its validity, as Tersa Rukowska-Harmstone points out:
"By the late seventies the defense justification for
the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe was no longer
credibly tenable. The West's repeated hands-off
attitude has meant the recognition that the region
belongs in the Soviet sphere of influence; moreover,
the Soviet Union's nuclear parity with the United
States has effectively precluded any such interference.
At the same time, the new German 'ostpolik' signaled
the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Germany of
the post war territorial settlement, the validity of
which has been legitimized by all the European states,
the United States and Canada at the 1975 Helsinki
Conference. -*-^ 8
The Western threat to the Soviet Union has greatly diminished
and invasion has never been more remote. Nevertheless, the
Soviet Union has built up its conventional and theater nuclear
power in the region with great intensity. Soviet military
hegemony in Eastern Europe, legitimized by the Warsaw Pact and
a network of bilateral and mutual defense agreements , evidently
regarded in Moscow as essential to the pursuits of Soviet in-
terests in Europe and world wide.
The international character of the Soviet Union as a global
power has fallen on an expansionistic and aggressive disposi-
tion over the past decade. Presently Soviet and Soviet proxy
forces can be found virtually world wide, supporting wars of
'national liberation. ' It is clear that with no real threat
to the Russian mainland, the Soviet enormous military build
up is a method primarily for checking Western response to its
aggressive, hegomonic ways in other areas of the world, by
dominating the West at all levels of military escalation, while
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undermining Western European's will to oppose Soviet actions
by a strategy of military blackmail. The center and heart of
the Soviet military menace is Poland. The nearness and con-
tinuity of the Russian Army to Western Europe has subtle but
real influences on their actions. The loss of Poland would
completely undermine Kremlin plans and it is undoubtedly con-
sidered of supreme importance that it does not occur. It is
therefore extremely thought provoking that the Soviet Union
has let the Polish problem progress as far as it has . Lack
of Soviet actions plainly demonstrate that powerful restraints
are affecting their behavior. It is as shown in the last sec-
tion, the limitations of Soviet action are, to a major extent,
economic
.
To fully grasp the extent of the political and economic
deterioration of Poland it is essential to view it in its
historic context. Poland emerged from the Second World War
completely devastated. What was not destroyed by the German/
Soviet invasion of 19 39 and subsequent occupation, was shipped
lock, stock and barrel to the U.S.S.R. after the war. Poland
still had a better chance at recovery than her eastern European
neighbors for she had a significantly larger population, a sea
coast, and most importantly a strong resource base, with coal,
sulphurs, copper, zinc, silver and lignite, having an energy
139
surplus until 1979.
The performance of the Polish economy since the adoption
of the Soviet type system of planning and management and the
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introduction of the first five-year plan in 19 50 can be largely
characterized as brief periods of intense growth followed by
long periods of growth decline. According to official statistics
the average annual rates of growth of produced national income,
that is to say domestic net material product, declined from 9.7
percent during the first industrialization drive effected under
the Stalinist system in 1950-55, to 7.7 percent during the first
years of Gomulka ' s leadership in 1956-58 under the influence of
large systemic changes; to 5-9 percent in 19 59-67; and to 5.7
percent in the last three years of Gomulka' s power in 1968-70;
this was followed by a burst of growth of 8.1 percent in 1971;
10.6 percent in 1972, 10.8 percent in 1973; 10.4 percent in
1974; and again decline to 9.0 percent in 1975; 6.8 percent
in 1976; 5.0 percent in 1972; 3.0 percent in 1978 to a dismal
140
-2.0 percent in 1979. There was a similar trend in the
average rates of growth of industrial product, accumulation,
fixed capital investment, total consumption and personal
consumption. (see table 3-1)
The plan of 1950-55 objective was the transformation and
development of the economy of socialist principles, the emphasis
was centralism. It called for the greatest possible exploita-
tion of productive capacity and of technological progress. The
fullest possible utilization of the productive resources of
the economy. This was the so-called strategy of extensive
development which in Poland, as in other East European countries,
followed closely the Soviet example. The process of growth
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on the increases in their productivity. Emphasis was placed
on developing heavy industry in order to provide a firm and
stable basis for the development and technical reconstruction
of heavy and light industry, agriculture and communications.
It was considered self-evident that the development of heavy
industries should precede the development of other branches of
the economy; most notably consumer goods. In view of these
assumptions it is not surprising that approximately 7 6 percent
of planned investment outlays were concentrated on capital goods
industries, and due to upwards revisions rose to 89 percent.
On many occasions plants were constructed without regard to the
142
supply of raw materials or regard to market potential.
Investment was woefully lacking in the agricultural sector.
Plans to increase production were based largely on attempts to
increase production per hectare through land improvements. A
combination of lack of incentives, and bad weather resulted in
143
stagnation and decline after the first year.
The results of the plan were far from satisfactory. Con-
sumer goods industries output fell from 12 to 8 percent from
government neglect. Their products were only remarkable for
their low quality, lack of assortment, crude finish, and fail-
ure to meet consumer tastes. The capital goods sector became
overdeveloped while light industry and agriculture was under-
144developed leading to grave effects on worker's morale.
The reactions to the economic failures of the first 5 year
plan were strikes and riots by Polish workers. These led to
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to the rise of Wladyslaw Gomulka to First Secretary. Gomulka,
under heavy pressure from the Soviets, was nevertheless able
to make significant changes which to a large extent pacified
worker discontent. However, after a pioneering experiment
with features of market socialism in 1956-58, there was a
return to the traditional Soviet model. The only real modifica-
tion was the continuation of individual agriculture, though the
government retained collectivization as its long-term policy.
Gomulka continued to maintain a system that was extremely
centralized, which depended on administrative commands that
could enforce a high degree of mobilization of resources and
their concentration in a few selected areas, but never able to
gain their efficient use. The continued policy of priority
development of heavy industry, which produced mostly goods for
domestic use for further industrialization, resulted in a
limited role for international trade. The "inward looking"
policy, by ignoring developments in the outside world, tended
to induce over-expansion of the heavy capital intensive branches
of metal and heavy engineering industries. Little or no atten-
tion was given to benefits from specialization and trade. The
newly developed industries were heavily capital-intensive and
material-intensive and, in the Polish case, import-intensive.
This structure was geared to the continued extensive pattern
of development and made the introduction of an intensive pat-
145tern difficult. The industrial structure had an adverse
affect on the expansion of exports and on profitable foreign
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trade. It lessened the opportunity of supplying the domestic
market with consumer goods. Nor was this inward policy con-
ducive to the generation of technological innovation or the
146
utilization of the results of research and development.
The system's inability to use innovation for productivity
growth is caused primarily by the lack of a spirit of innova-
tion and risk-taking at all levels of economic activity. What-
ever the advantages of central planning and direction making
for science, policy and control may be its major problem is one
of diffusion of technical progress. Experience of industrial-
ized countries has shown that technical progress has not only
been propelled by the major inventions, but by the cumulative
effect of many minor ones. These minor innovations are those
147
that the centralized system has difficulties generating.
The obstacles that the over-directed centralized system
produce are primarily derived from the disruptive effect of
over-emphasis on current activity. These obstacles include:
inordinate pressure on plan fulfillment
- the incentive system supporting quantity
weak rewards from entrepreneurs
lack of motivation among workers
priority of quantity over quality.
The constant pressure to fulfill plans that are often unrealis-
tic, force plant and industry managers to use reserves that




By the mid-1960' s it was well recognized that the source
of extensive growth, labor and capital, would soon be drying
up and a switch from extensive growth to intensive would be
necessary. Furthermore, because of the neglect in comparative
advantage considerations and the past reliance on Soviet blue-
prints and machinery, many newly established industries were
not internationally competitive. The inability to expand
profitable exports created a balance-of-payment difficulty.
A considerable restructuring of the economy was, therefore,
needed to reduce capital, promote an intensive pattern of
growth, and create a viable export sector.
To shift from extensive to intensive it is required that:
(1) reforms are implemented to increase efficiency; (2) re-
structure and modernize the industrial base; and (3) accelerate
148technical progress. A reduction in investment is also
needed in order to remove the undesirable pressures often asso-
ciated with extreme levels of investment which included in the
Polish case: delayed commissioning of capacities, no increase
of consumer capacities, shortages of consumer goods accentua-
149
ted by growing spending power and shortages of raw materials.
In addition it was necessary to prepare reserves to reduce
the degree which the market is solely a sellers market, to
secure sufficient supplies of consumer goods.
However, at the same time, it was impossible to introduce
an intensive growth pattern without enormous restructuring of
the industrial structure. Since the early 1950s the Polish
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economy was almost completely isolated from the world economy
and a policy of horizontal expansion was followed. Polish
plants were established exactly to Soviet specification. The
technology was largely that which had been in use in the Soviet
Union for a long time and the newly constructed plants were
obsolete at the time of their commissioning. As the same
policy was applied to other East European countries their
economies became parallel and extreme problems therefore
,
developed, in trading among them. This led to unprofitable
industries that had to be subsidized at the expense of other
sectors, including those like agriculture, which produced some
traditional exports. Those enterprises which were making
losses persistently and were subsidized at the expense of the
rest of the economy had to be replaced or reduced and modern
competitive processes needed to be introduced.
A reconstruction program of such magnitude requires a large
volume of investment. A new investment drive seemed incompat-
ible with requirements of reducing the pressures within the
economy and increasing consumer consumption. Gomulka was thus
faced with what Polish analyst Zbigniew M. Fullenbuch calls
the socialist "vicious circle of stagnation."
The Fifth Party Congress held in 19 68 attempted to find a
way of breaking out of the vicious circle. With Czechoslovakia's
experience firmly in mind, structural changes were given
priority. The main emphasis was placed on "selective develop-
ment," which is the development in areas that would result in
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Poland being one of the world's major producers of certain
items which were to reach high standards of quality and
sophistication
.
The line of action was doomed to failure. First, an exces-
sively large number of industries were selected for specializa-
tion for export. Moreover, the selection was based on central
authority that apparently had little contact with the signals
of the international market. Finally, the ability to divert
funds from consumption to the new investment drive was greatly
over estimated. The push required new austerity on top of a
low standard of living, two decades of austerity, and economic
stagnation.
The results by 1969 of Poland's rapidly rising output was
massive stock increases in the nation's warehouses. By 1970
152the total value of stock was half that of the GNP. ' The
country faced the specter of mass unemployment, laying off
200,000 workers in 1970. The end for Gomulka was written in
the streets by the riots of December 1970.
Perhaps if any one item can be said to be the most signif-
icant underlying cause of Gomulka' s downfall it is agriculture
— that seemingly perpetual sore point of the Socialist system.
Poland's agriculture is unique in that it is the only centrally
planned economy that depends largely on private farming. As
in other East European countries, in the first half of the
19 50s the agricultural policy in Poland was characterized by
a forced, though gradual and cautious, collectivization drive.
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At the peak of collectivization nearly one-half of the agri-
cultural land was confiscated by the state, which came mostly
from former German nationals, Polish citizens of German descent,
153
collaborators and large land-holders. Of this 60 percent
was redistributed to peasants and the balance was used to
establish state farms.
The collectivization drive began in the late 1940s, but
by its peak effort only 7 percent of agricultural households
and about 10 percent of agricultural output originated in the
collective sector. But this small quantity greatly under-
... . . 154
states the impact of collectivization on Polish agriculture.
The cost of collectivization was not as high as it was in
the Soviet Union in terms of sheer magnitude of misery, but
was nonetheless noticeable. State harassment of a nonsubmis-
sive peasantry, which was organized and dominated by the church,
caused crop and livestock production to stagnate. The rulers
found not only was it difficult to compel the peasants to pro-
duce, but work slowed down, farmers reduced the acreage under
cultivation, restricted their production of meat and increased
self consumption. Wladyslaw Gomulka rose to power in 19 56
because the past regime was unable to use the collective farm
as an instrument of political power and coercion over the
peasantry in which to force increased production.
Gomulka halted forced collectivization and instead insti-
tuted a voluntary policy of long term "socialization" which
was based on attrition of ranks of private farmers to change
99

the structure of land ownership. As a farmer was about to
retire, the state would "buy" his farm with a pension.
The policies of the 19 50s, though falling short of funda-
mental change, were at least more pragmatic. The need for
increased investment of resources to support agricultural
activity was recognized. There was some awareness that fear
and uncertainty about the future proved to be poor motivators
and long term production output suffered. The crux of the
government's problem was that the underlying goal was the
socialization of agriculture, but also a critical need to
increase output. To use bold steps to take over large num-
bers of private farms discourages productivity, for peasant's
perceive the threats to their livelihood or property rights.
On the other hand, to maintain increases of output requires
pragmatic incentives and incomes to farmers which tends to
strengthen their hold on their land which frustrated any drive
for socialization.
The Gomulka leadership felt it was necessary to social-
ize for a socialized farm would, according to Gomulka, be
more efficient in the long run. Secondly, in an environment
of the central plan, privately controlled agriculture was
quite responsive to market forces, but not responsive enough
to the plan. Gomulka thereby tried to force socialization
by investment distribution.
The principle of parity of investment with industry was
established in 1965. From that point forward, agriculture
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was to receive an equal share of productive investment as its
share of the national income. As shown below the outlay of
investment went up dramatically during the rule of Gomulka.
The production of fertilizers climbed strikingly. By 1968
it had tripled over the figure of 1958. There was also great
increases of quality seed and machinery.
155
TABLE 3-2 x^
Investment Outlays on Agriculture 19 56-70 in Million of Zloty
at 1961 Constant Prices
1956-60 1961-65 1966-70
Farm buildings 19,881 29,243 59,766
Mechanization 20,153 33,889 50,357
Soil drainage 5,716 12,694 19,457
Total 69,457 102,710 172,797
However, two-thirds of the machinery still went to state
and collective farms. In general private agriculture received
less than half of the total investment outlay, although it
contributed over 80 percent of total production. Such lack
of support for the private sector was interpreted as an at-
tempt to show how costly and inferior private farming is when
compared with the socialized sector.
The state continued to impose unpopular compulsory del-
ivery quotas on centrally determined terms . The peasant was
forced to buy agriculture inputs at a socialized sector, and
sell large portions of his output at consistently unprofitable
conditions. The planners tried to maintain prices that would
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increase the profitability of all farmers. However, the Polish
agriculture had an additional problem of economy of size. Un-
like the Soviet Union where farm size is uneconomical because
it is too large, agriculture in Poland's private sector was un-
economical because it was too small.
The development of medium and large scale private farms
seemed to be ruled out for mostly political reasons. The small
farms were not conducive to economical mechanization. Many
small non-productive farms were taken over by the state. Un-
fortunately, unless the farms were adjacent to a state or col-
lective farm they were put out of production until socializa-
tion reached their area.
The effect of the incremental socialization, the lack of
adequate investment in private agriculture, and the poor pric-
ing policies of the Gomulka period was the reduction of the
average yearly increase of all agricultural production during
the 1966-70 period to 1.8 percent, which was exactly the aver-
age annual increase during the disastrous years of the Six
Year Plan, and only half the rate of increase of the 1961-65
1 S6
period. Legislation was passed in 1963 and 19 68 to limit
the subdivision of farms to facilitate the compulsory acquisi-
tion of private farms with some compensation by the state.
The smouldering discontent of the 1960s ended in a politi-
cal explosion in the middle of December 1970. Two conditions
caused widespread food shortages: First, after three good
harvests the bad weather conditions in 1969 and 1970 severely
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reduced agricultural output , and secondly, Gomulka ' s capital
accumulation drive and his belief that agricultural self-
sufficiency resulted in the cessation of imports of grain to
feed livestock. The number of cattle and pigs fell drastically
and, as in 1959 and 1964, a steep rise in the price of meat
became necessary. It was simultaneously decided to raise
prices on a wide range of consumer goods as part of a general
deregulation of prices. In the form of a Council Ministers'
decree, the new higher prices were published on December 13.
The results were an average of 8 percent on basic consumer
goods and in some cases a much higher percentage.
On December 14 the workers in Gdansk went on strike and
staged a political demonstration in the city's center. Gomulka
considering the demonstrators counter-revolutionary, refused
to have any dialogue with the strikers , and sent the police
to break up the strikes. The strikers in Gdansk clashed with
the police and became increasingly violent, burning several
public buildings including the local headquarters of the party.
The following day violence continued spreading to the neighbor-
ing city of Gdynia. The police and the army were authorized
the use of firearms. The army equipped with tanks, went into
action the night of the 15th. On the 16th disturbances spread
to Elbug and on the following day violent strikes and clashes
broke out in Szczecin on the western Baltic coast. A state of
national emergency was called on the 17th, the first time
since World War II.
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A meeting of the politburo was held on the 18th during
which Gomulka was said to have suffered a minor stroke and was
taken to the hospital. On 20 December, Gomulka ostensibly
resigned his post for reasons of health and Edward Gierek was
appointed first secretary.
In the final analysis Gomulka failed because of his own
inadequacies and those under the system he worked. When
Gomulka came to power in October 19 56 he embodied the hopes
of his countrymen for a better future, offering greater par-
ticipation in government, a free society and, most of all,
economic prosperity. Initially he seemed to meet these hopes,
but in the end he bitterly disappointed the Polish people.
The climate during the 1960s was largely favorable to reform.
However, Gomulka was too cautious, too unimaginative and too
much of a traditionalist to see the necessity for radical
change. It cannot be said that Gomulka was the sole cause of
the economic failure for he worked under many constraints and
the constraints of the system were the greatest of all.
Edward Gierek, 57 at the time he acquired leadership, did
not hold a broad base of power. He was favored by many of the
younger, technical-minded party members, but his principal
source of strength was the allegiance of the coal miners from
Upper Silesia. 1 Gierek faced the possibility that he would
be unable to break out from the vicious circle of extensive
development during the period when time was running short.
Gierek was confronted by the same intractable problems , a
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system that was unresponsive and facing slow degeneration and
a labor force that was increasingly more resistive.
Gierek's initial moves were conciliatory. He ended the
state of emergency, the increases in the price of food were
cancelled and local centers of dissatisfaction were pacified
by special dispensation of imported lemons and oranges . Double
allotments of bread were made along with other moves that had
the effect of increasing worker morale.
The extremely unpopular system of the incentive bonus was
withdrawn. The lowest wage brackets, mostly that of pension-
ers, was raised. The real wage overall was increased by 5.7
percent in 1971 and 6.4 percent in 1972. (see Table 3-3)
For the agricultural sector there was a policy geared to
quickly improve food supplies, especially meat. Prices for
obligatory deliveries and for contracted food was increased
in 1971 and all obligatory deliveries abolished as of January
1st, 1972. Financial contributions by farmers to the National
Health Insurance was reduced at the same time, coverage was
extended to all of the agricultural population.
As the result of these and other measures net real incomes
of the population increased by 9.2 percent in 1971 and 12.3
percent in 197 2 and net real income of the agricultural popula-
159tion by 9.3 and 9.9 percent. These improvements to the
standard of living and appeals to the population concerning
their patriotic duty greatly stabilized the situation.
A "Joint Party-State Commission on the Modernization of
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was formed to develop a "new development strategy." Out of
the commission came a plan whose basic premise was that in
order to escape the vicious circle of extensive development,
both investment and consumption must grow at the same time.
Investments must be large enough to restructure the economy,
to modernize its industrial capacity, and to build a viable
export sector. This task had been previously frustrated by
a lack of material incentives. However, this time increases
of consumption were planned in order to stimulate increases
in labor productivity and to secure support from the popula-
tion for the new leadership. The fatal flaw in this plan was
that it was only possible if considerable foreign capital
could be secured.
The planners expected that with massive help of Western
credits and more importantly, imported technology, there would
be a rapid expansion in the production of competitive, sophis-
ticated and efficiently produced commodities. These goods
were to be produced in new, or extensively modernized plants,
utilizing the most modern Western technology, at western
standards with some industrial cooperation licensing arrange-
ments with Western firms. It was therefore planned that in
a few short years an excess of exports over imports would
occur and the debts could then be rapidly repaid. Exports to
other CMEA countries, less-developed countries and western
nations would increase production and industrial expansion




In the final analysis the Gierek leadership did not suc-
ceed because its economic plan was widely over-ambitious,
gravely flawed, a voluntarist economic policy characterized
by incompetent planning and management and most importantly,
an unstable labor force, in which nationalism and religious
forces were willing to challenge political authority and its
economic policies.
The policy initially yielded positive results. In the
years 1971-75, the net industrial product increased at the
rate of almost 11 percent per year, which is about 30 percent
faster than the preceding decade. Real industrial wages rose
7.2 percent annually, compared with 18 percent in the 1971-75
period.
In the 1971-75 period, the average rate of investment on
fixed capital was 18.4 percent and the average rate of growth
of industrial investment was 21.9 percent. The annual rates
of growth of investment in the economy at constant prices
increased from 7.5 percent in 1971 to 23.6 percent in 1972
and 28 percent in 1973. The rate was reduced, but still very
high, at 22.5 percent in 1974 and 14.2 percent in 1975. In-
dustrial investment on fixed capital was growing even more
rapidly with 10.4 percent growth in 1971, 34.6 percent in
1972, 22.2 percent in 1974 and 17 percent in 1975 at constant
163prices.
Past experience should have shown planners the problems
of excessive investment. Twice before in the 1950s and early
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1960s the optimum level of investment was exceeded with nega-
tive consequences. The extremely high rates of growth greatly
surpassed the capacity of the construction and engineering
enterprises. Enormous disproportions and bottlenecks were
formed. The unfinished investment projects grew rapidly,
resulting in deterioration in workmanship. The final utiliza-
tion of the foreign technology was highly inefficient and its
diffusion slow. As the planners in all the Soviet-like econo-
mies are discovering/ the import of technology and credits can-
not serve as a substitute for structural reforms in the long
run.
This rapid influx of investment created a correspondingly
rapid climb in personal income. The improvement in the stand-
ard of living in 1971-75 exceeded even the plan. The rate of
growth of real wages was 7.2 percent in 1971-75, while the
planned rate was 3.4 percent. This situation created immense
inflationary pressures which resulted in increased imports
.
The policy was "consumption must become the engine of growth,"
which forced planners to import consumer goods that could not
164be supplied rapidly enough domestically.
After decades of suppressed personal incomes , improvements
were undoubtedly required. Considerable increases in monetary
incentives were needed in order to induce greater worker effort,
Productivity indeed increased due to greater worker exertion
and mechanization. Nevertheless, productivity did not keep up
with planner's expectations. The overall low productivity
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growth was the result of inefficient use of capital, insuf-
ficient time to train workers, and a misunderstanding of the
tenacity and magnitude of system constraints.
It was absolutely essential for the success of the new
development program that exports rapidly increase to hard cur-
rency countries in order to pay off debts.
As shown in table 3-4 problems were encountered with in-
creasing exports. The actual rates of growth, except for the
initial period, lagged behind planned rates. The planned rate
increase was 12.9 percent in 1973, actual was 11.0 percent.
In 1974 the two rates were 18 percent and 12.8 percent, and
22.3 and 8.3 percent in 1975.
There were many reasons for the unsatisfactory performance
in the export field. Primarily Gierek's planners did not take
into account the possibility of an economic recession in the
west which would make Poland's products unmarketable and
imports expensive. Nor did they apparently do any market
research on Poland's comparative advantages. Instead of
capitalizing on Poland's supply of cheap labor, Polish invest-
ors tried to compete with Western and Japanese products. This
Poland has largely been unable to do for the lack of marketing,
advertising, servicing and spare parts, among other things,
for their export products.
The Poles also had a large domestic market as a result of
the excessive expansion of industry. The domestic market
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too demanding to the Polish enterprises. Exports require more
effort, initiative and flexibility, commodities seldom found
in socialistic economies.
The areas of investment, true to Marxism philosophy, were
to a very large extent highly material intensive. The main
investment projects which were started in 1971-75 in iron and
steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals and building materials was
material and therefore, import intensive. Furthermore, the
industries were energy intensive, at a time of increasing
energy costs and rapidly changing markets. These investment
projects demanded a 30 percent increase in fuels and energy by
1980, while domestic fuels and energy production, a large export
earner, increased only 18 percent. The mix of investment
projects thereby created a significant balance of payments
pressure. These pressures are now having a serious effect on
the Polish economy in that the investment decisions to make
production more material and energy intensive forced produc-
tion to be dependent on the ability to acquire imports. With
limited hard currency earnings this can be a spiraling problem
in the years to come.
Foreign trade performance was also affected by recession
and "stagflation" among the Western economies. The inflation
aspect increased prices beyond that planned not only for raw
materials, but also for industrial materials required for
completion of modernization. At the same time the "stag" or





The final restraint on exports concerned the central plan-
ning apparatus. In the west, the producer who can guarantee
the quality of the product, rapidly change its specifications
and characteristics in response to market changes, who can
alter the product mix, obtain all necessary materials and
parts, will be the firm who obtains the business. The "decree
from above" system is slow and incapable of meeting perform-
ance demands commonplace in the west. Since few of the pro-
ducts the Polish decided to produce were unique to the world
or in great demand, it was necessary for radical
system changes to perform adequately to secure a part of the
market. The systemic modification failed to materialize and
thereby hampered the overall push for export increases.
The adoption of the new development strategy showed re-
markable results in the first half of the 1970s. In terms of
rates of growth, the Domestic Net Material Product increased
6.0 percent in 1966-70 advancing to a robust 9.8 percent in
1971-75, but declining to 3 . 2 percent in 1976-79. (Refer to
Table 3-4) Difficulties appeared first in 1971-75, and became
quite serious by 1977. By 1979 the inability to continue
financing growth with foreign capital led to the first ab-
solute reduction in national product since the end of the
Second World War.
The very impressive growth experienced in the first half
of the 1970s was clearly the result of foreign investment.
It represented 9 . 3 percent in investment in fixed capital
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and changes in stocks (Accumulation in Marxist terminology) in
1973, 12.3 percent in 1974, 15.5 percent in 1975 and 16.0
percent in 1976. In 1972-76 there was also a large inflow of
western technology, and the increased use of western licenses.
In 1971-77 some 300 licenses were purchased as compared with
106 in 1948-65 and 121 in 1966-70. This massive investment
strategy resulted in increased growth of fixed capital per
employee, which was 5.9 percent in 1971-7 5, as compared with
only 2.8 percent in 1961-65.
The average rate of growth of capital productivity was
1.7 percent in 1971-7 5, breaking down to a growth of 1.8 per-
cent in 1971, 3.8 percent in 1972 and a continuous decline
beginning the following year. Since it is doubtful that the
newly created productive capacities were increasingly less
efficient the decline must be the result of incomplete capital
utilization. This was the result of many things, including:
wrong investment decisions resulting in an inability to sell
the produced output; delays in completion of investment projects;
the lack of supporting infrastructure to place completed indus-
tries into operation; and, because of a shortage of energy of
169
materials to operate newly created industry.
The deficit in trade with western countries was extremely
high in the first half of the 1970s. By 1977 the rising trend
was reversed, but not sufficiently to stop net indebtedness
from increasing rapidly. It became $10.6 billion in 1976.
$13.5 billion in 1977, $16.9 in 1978, $19.5 billion in 1979,
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$20.6 billion in 1980 and perhaps up to $27 billion by the end
of this year.
It seems that at the end of the first five years the Polish
leadership did not yet fully appreciate the magnitude of the
170problems that began to show themselves in 1974. The direc-
tives for the Seventh Party Congress issued at the end of 197 5
were full of praise about the unqualified success of the new
development strategy. There was no indication that the im-
mense growth was achieved on credit and the indebtedness of
171
the country was growing rapidly.
In practice the decision to abandon the new development
strategy was already forced upon them. To achieve a positive
balance in trade with the West by 1978, exports were to grow
at an average rate of 14 percent. At the same time foreign
investment had to be reduced significantly. Domestic produc-
tion was to supply 7 4 percent of total domestic requirements
by 1980 compared with 66 percent in 1975. The import of
machinery was to be reduced by 4 percent and the import of
172grain by 50 percent.
The adoption of the plan to decrease the investment coming
from foreign sources implied an end to the new development
strategy. With the slowdown of foreign capital, the growth
also declined. The pattern of development, instead of becom-
ing more intensive, had in effect become far more extensive.
This development was directly related to the way the new
developments strategy was implemented. Planners tried to
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restructure the economy in too short a period and without con-
sidering the necessary introduction of systemic changes.
The planners aggravated the problem by reducing the deficit
in trade with drastic cuts in imports. The cuts had a shock
effect which stunted industrial production since industry was
unable to purchase materials required for production.
Agriculture received considerable attention in the first
half of 1970. The Gierek regime, being ushered to power by
food price rates, was quick to improve food supplies, especially
meat. The new policy was aimed at the private sector. To
increase farmer incentive to rebuild herds, the price of live-
stock products was increased three times during the first 18
months of Gierek 's rule. Additionally, grain prices were in-
creased, land tax rates were reduced, compulsory deliveries
were abolished and finally the farmers were given legal title
123
to their land.
The effect was immediate, with a surge of farm production
and sales as shown in table 3-5.
Per capita consumption rose dramatically; per capita con-
sumption of meat rose from 53 kilograms in 1970 to 62 kilo-
grams in 197 3.
Gierek, not learning from past efforts, still considered
the socialization of agriculture as a priority long-term goal.
Through attempted speed up of retirements and by liberalizing
terms for eligibility in receiving farm pensions he hoped to





Private Farm Gross Output Per Hectare of Land
1971 1972 1973
Crops:
Output 101 112 120
*
Sales 106 108 119
Livestock:
Output 106 120 128
Sales 102 126 136
*
Including sales on peasant markets.
Further, despite initial efforts to boost farm income, by
late 1974 earnings were again on the decline due to rising
farm costs. At the same time poor weather reduced yields of
domestically produced foodstuffs. Farmers fearing less deliv-
eries of mixed feed, held back on grain deliveries.
The state was increasingly forced to import grain. The
rising prices and the inability to raise food prices led the
government to pass the burden on to the farmer. This led to
sharp reductions in farmer disposable income by 6.6 percent in
1974 and 6.3 percent in 1975.
With incomes falling the improved pension benefits resulted
in a turn over of private land to the state of more than 300
percent increase between 1974 and 1975. Unfortunately the land
parcels gained by the state were small and scattered, much of
it unsuited for capital-intensive cultivation. During the
1971-75 period, the result was nearly 400,000 hectares put
out of production. This could have resulted in a reduction of
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about 1 million tons annually of grain, or 38 percent of
175
average net imports during 1971-7 5.
Meat shortages became acute by late 1975. The regime
reaction was the threatened seizure of private land that
achieved below average yields. Faced with a falling income
and renewed government hostility, the private farmer's enthus-
iasm quickly waned.
The next move by Warsaw was an attempt to control demand
and it was about as successful as its efforts in controlling
the farmers. In mid-1976 in an attempt at controlling demand,
food prices were raised. The magnitude of the prices, averag-
ing 69 percent for meat, 30 percent for poultry, 60 percent
for cheese, 100 percent for sugar and 30 percent for selected
vegetables, led to the violent riots of that year. Demonstra-
tions and often violent and widespread destruction of property
and state owned factories forced the regime to withdraw the
price increases the following day.
A "new" approach was announced for agriculture. The new
policy was essentially the old policy that Gierek had used at
the beginning of his rule. Additionally the new farm policy
included: (1) expanding production and improving efficiency;
(2) enlarging the size of more productive farms at the expense
of small farms; (3) boosting the share of private farm output
17 6produced on contract with the state.
The results of the "new approach" were anything but
satisfactory. Output of farm goods failed to rise substantially
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After the heavy criticism of 1975-76 the agricultural workers
were poorly motivated and highly skeptical of the regime's long
run intentions.
Because of the regime's inability to raise food prices,
farm products had to be heavily subsidized. The partial re-
moval of subsidies and the slight rise in food prices on July
1, 1980 led directly to the Polish labor uprising that forced
Gierek out of office.
Since the fall of Gierek the government seems unable to
face up to its economic problems. It seems that the govern-
ment's position is that it was not the right time to introduce
reforms, because of the existence of serious macroeconomic
domestic and external disequilibria.
It is almost uniform opinion of Polish and foreign econo-
mists that Poland's present difficulties cannot be eliminated
and no recovery is possible without bold systemic changes.
Presently no such changes are being implemented, nor as of the
time of this writing, are any formulated.
It is a growing feeling among Western bankers that they
may well lose their money over Poland. Western loans had to
be rescheduled, while payment on loans from the Soviet Union
were deferred until 1986. Economic information leaving Poland
is commonly described as a highly imaginative mix of "pure
177propaganda and wild economic projections."
The Soviets have contributed financial help to the Polish
economy. Besides deferring payment on past loans they have
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extended additional credit of at least $1.5 billion over the
past year. Poland's deputy foreign minister, Marion
Dobrosielski, reported that Poland had received $4.5 billion
17 8in aid from the U.S.S.R. since the summer of 1980.
The deterioration of the Polish economy in the past few
years can hardly be understated. Because of strikes and the
lack of hard currency to buy raw materials, industrial produc-
tion has dropped 18 percent in May of 1981 when compared with
one year ago. The projected annual decline in national in-
come, Deputy Prime Minister Madej reported to the Polish Parlia-
ment in July 1981, is 15 percent. Without new credits, its
exports this year will not be enough to pay interest payments
on non-rescheduled loans.
The plans for economic stabilization are yet to be firmed
up into a usable scheme. For the short term, increased coal
production, development of private agriculture, removing of
subsidies to raise retail prices, and restore a balance to
the domestic market, and diverting energy, raw materials and
manpower to industries geared to export, are all often men-
tioned solutions. What will be eventually possible is diffi-
cult to foresee.
A longer term solution needs to be a revision of the entire
structure of economic planning. Decentralization of decision
making, decreasing the authority of the Central Planning Com-
mission and turning individual enterprises into self regulat-
ing units are all necessary elements that have long been
recommended by Western analysts.
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The problem short term recovery efforts are having is
that "Solidarity" has opposed measures of higher prices,
longer hours, and worker relocation. It will be necessary,
though perhaps not possible, to persuade the Polish worker of
the overriding importance of such measures.
In the long term, the increasing dependence the Poles are
having on the Soviet Union, by supplemented Soviet oil and
loans, place a significant degree of leverage with the Kremlin
leaders over Polish economic decisions. Moscow is bound to
become resistant to economic changes that are contrary to
Marxism-Leninism
.
The prospects for the 1980s are desperate in the short
and medium run, but the longer run is not totally hopeless.
Ideally the Party could leap beyond Gdansk in a brotherly
agreement with Solidarity and the workers, blessed by the
Church, which induces full cooperation of the Polish people
in a plan of austerity, revolutionary economic reforms in
industry and agriculture and hard work under competent
management. Soviet and Western creditors could be generous
and patient, international economic conditions could improve
and the weather could be favorable. Such factors could then
129lead to external and internal equilibrium.
The conditions for ideal economic recovery seem unlikely.
The Polish people have lost faith in their system and seem
unwilling to make significant and continued sacrifices to pay
for the mistakes of the 1970s.
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If the Soviets do not intervene, the more realistic pros-
pects are difficult to foresee and are largely dependent on
the changes inacted to the centralized economic planning
system. Solidarity has shown some restraint at the time of
this writing (September 1981) , but it is difficult to estimate
the amount of control Solidarity can effect on the workers if
unpleasant orders are required. The most optimistic economists
do not expect any turn around until 1986. Even these assume
rationalization of the price structure; reallocation of invest-
ment; modernization of the private sector in agriculture; major
reforms of the economic system; and, a lengthy period of
180
austerity. This may be a great deal to assume.
The Polish leaders must obtain worker cooperation and a
positive plan. If they are too tough they could provoke a
worker explosion that, no matter the economic consequences,
could force a Soviet intervention. If they manage to succeed
in muzzling Solidarity they could lose Western cooperation
from creditors. Such an act would result in a cut off of
imports, and economic chaos. The stakes are high, the solu-





War in the future may become obsolete.
It will be too expensive to wage.
—Dr. Looney
—
The economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe range
from poor to desperate. In past years cheap and abundant Soviet
oil, Western trade and capital fed a program of consumerism
and modernization. Increased economic interdependence with
the West has become a necessity of economic policy in most of
these countries. The means of fulfilling economic goals will
be sharply restricted in each of the Warsaw Pact nations for
a variety of reasons in the upcoming years. If the Soviet
Union invades Poland the spector of economic collapse could
be realized resulting in financial chaos, suffering, and
political upheavel thereby forcing the Soviet Union into an
unacceptable situation requiring action that could create the
gravest risks to itself and world security.
In the eyes of many East Europeans the benefits of Western
"economic miracles" await East European economies from the
effective utilization of imported technology. In order to
increase the efficiency of production and raise the quality
of products to the level that would be competitive in the
world market, increased importation of Western processes and
technology is required. The expanding necessity to import
oil from OPEC countries to sustain domestic economic growth
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demands the generation of "hard goods." Without the ability
to pay for imported oil and Eastern European economies can
* i • 181only stagnate or decline.
The expansion of hard currency trade continues to pose
extreme difficulties. Eastern European goods, even those con-
structed with Western technology, are often not competitive
on world markets. This places a dilemma on the governments
of Eastern Europe. On one hand the need to keep the Western
debt burden to manageable portions, to economize scarce hard
currency resources for domestic and Eastern markets and to
reduce their like exposure to economic crisis and political
upheavals due to Western commercial relations, such inter-
course should be held down. But, on the other hand, to satiate
the essentials of interdependence, modernization and consumer-
ism a policy requires the opposite.
Oil, natural gas and other raw materials and industrial
requirements are expanding, creating often critical import
necessities from the U.S.S.R. which are needed in the drive
for growth. Soviet price increases and frequent requirements
to provide hard currency in payments reflect its own inability
to continue as a source of cheap raw materials and its grow-
ing need of Western goods.
Such costs have had a negative effect on Eastern economies
,
generating pressures to reduce the overall trade with the
U.S.S.R. and Western Europe. However, Warsaw Pact and Eastern
solidarity tend to impose high cost and burdens on domestic
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economic planning that are difficult to side step. Further-
more as arduous as economic relations among CMEA and the
Soviet Union are
r
the Soviet supply of energy is still the
critical aspect of Eastern European economic growth, and with-
out it the CMEA would not be a viable economic unit.
In order to restructure the Soviet like economies from
extensive to intensive, priority must be given to investment,
especially for the construction of modern plants and facili-
ties that can generate hard goods . Future growth and economic
health depends largely on investment and to efficient use.
Current pressures force giving priority to programs that
have adverse effects on domestic investment. These include
increasing domestic consumption for incentives; Western re-
payments of loans; and maintaining agreed on Warsaw Pact de-
fense claims. Defense expenditures preempt scarce, high
quality production facilities and skilled manpower. The mili-
tary effort of the six Eastern European Warsaw Pact countries
is quite substantial, amounting to about one-half the force
size of the United States with about one fifth the total de-
fense outlays of the United States in 1977. If the Soviets
invade Poland a Western response will surely be increased
defense outlays that will undoubtedly result in the Soviet
Union reciprocating and forcing its allies to do likewise.
In the atmosphere that is increasingly facing Soviet type
economies, the inadequacies of their economic management sys-
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the central administrative command system, which have been
well known for decades, are now at a critical level. Move-
ment must be made toward market socialism or perhaps a cen-
trally planned system that is effectively modified to increase
flexibility of the economy which is necessary to expand ex-
ports to the West.
As shown in table 4-1 the Soviet and Eastern European debt
has risen dramatically in recent years. By 1979 debt service
equaled 18 percent of Soviet earnings, 92 percent for Poland,
54 percent for German Democratic Republic, 37 percent for
Hungary, 22 percent for Romania and Czechoslovakia, and 38
= i 184percent for Bulgaria.
The Soviet Union is in the most favorable position present-
ly among the CMEA countries, and should remain so for the fore-
seeable future. In 1978 Moscow earned an import/export surplus
of $1.3 billion largely through heavy gold and arms sales. As
a result, gross Soviet hard currency debt grew only by $1.5
billion. Although gold sales were reduced from 4 00 tons in
1978 to 220 tons in 1979 (see table 4-2) , the jump in gold
prices allowed the Soviet Union to earn $2.2 billion in addi-
ng c
tion to substantial arms sales.
Continued high prices for gold and oil, along with greater
earnings from arms sales should continue to maintain a manage-
able export balance. In the longer run, production problems
for oil, the mainstay of Soviet hard currency earnings, which
fell for the third straight year, will have a significant









Current account balance 7 51 1,266 4,111
Trade balance -3,300 -3,794 -2,609
Exports, f.o.b. 11,345 13,157 19,524
Imports, f.o.b. -14,645 16,951 21,593
Gold sales 1,597 2,673 2,200
Invisible and other hard


















Including net earnings from tourism, transportation,
investment income, official transfers, military sales, and
known hard currency trade under bilaterial clearning agreements
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The Eastern European countries, without large gold deposits,
oil surpluses or a viable arms export business will be in a
much poorer shape in the upcoming years. As Soviet oil produc-
tion levels off and perhaps decreases, Eastern Europeans will
have a critical need for foreign oil. If commercial banks,
after experiencing the Polish problem, are still willing to
continue lending to Eastern European countries, then the prob-
able trend for indebtedness is a rapid rise.
The Soviet Union is under immense pressure to crush the
Polish rebellion. The growth of a powerful independent trade
union movement poses a grave threat to the Soviet's hold on
Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Soviet efforts at dominating
Western Europe would be all but destroyed by a neutral Poland.
However, the cost in terms of economics appears to be poten-
tially infinitely greater.
At a minimum the consequences that would result from a
Soviet invasion of Poland would be:
(1) Polish default on loans. Western credit agencies and
banks would no longer be willing to roll over or refinance
maturing debts.
(2) Greatly diminished lending to other Eastern European
countries.
(3) A NATO boycott of the Soviet Union in the areas of
grain, technology and machinery.
(4) Greatly increased defense spending, by the NATO coun-
tries and perhaps China.
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(5) Complete loss of stature among 3rd world countries.
(6) A stronger western stance by OPEC countries.
The long term effects of such actions would be difficult
to determine. If the Soviet Union is able to pick up Poland's
debt then the legal effects of default would be avoided. How-
ever, it is questionable if the Soviets are capable or willing
to absorb an additional $30 billion dollar debt. The Soviet
debt would nearly double and it is doubtful that they are wil-
ling, or have enough gold or other hard currency earnings to
cover the additional indebtedness payments. Furthermore, if
the Polish debt could be rescheduled for a longer period of
time, the Kremlin planners would still find it difficult to
pay due to their upcoming hard currency problems relating to
declining oil production exports. If default cannot be avoided,
attachments of Polish cargoes, ships and foreign assets would
be forthcoming.
The results of a arain and technology embargo would have
little short term effect. Other grain producing countries
would probably be willing to continue to export to the Soviet
Union even under U.S. pressure not to do so. However, it is
doubtful the Soviets could continue to buy the necessary
amounts of grain to keep from distress slaughtering of
livestock. Furthermore, the price of grain would undoubtedly
be significantly higher, affecting balance of payment problems.
The great inponderable is, of course, how the Poles would
react. The Polish army is 317,000 man strong with a long
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anti-Russian tradition. Polish villagers are avid hunters and
good marksmen, while the country's miners have plenty of dyna-
mite with which to blow up railroad and supply lines.
If the peasantry burns their crops and the factory workers
destroy their factories then the Soviets would be faced with a
Polish welfare problem. The Soviet Union does not have the
capacity to feed itself, it is extremely doubtful they would
be able to buy enough grain to feed both the Soviet citizens
and the Poles.
The Soviets would then be faced with a choice of depriving
Soviet citizens to feed Poles, or letting the Polish popula-
tion starve. Neither alternative would be particularly at-
tractive to the Soviet leadership. If the Soviets did the
former, the Soviet citizen could revolt. If they decided on
the latter, the West would be greatly hardened in their re-
solve to maintain sanctions against the Soviet Union.
The lack of technology imports to the Soviet Union would
have only minimal effects initially. However, in the longer
term the effects could be catastrophic. Oil and gas produc-
tion are largely maintained by Western technological products
and pipe. The complete cut off of both would greatly acceler-
ate the oil problems the Soviets are presently facing. A
shortfall in oil and gas production would have enormous affect
on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
If the technology boycott remains in effect for more than
one or two years the overall effect on Soviet industry would
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become much greater. Though technological Western products
are only of marginal value in short run, they have the affect
of keeping the Soviet industry current and providing gains in
productivity over longer periods of time.
The Soviet economy is strained to a high degree. It is
providing the maximum amount of investment that is sustain-
able without massive cuts in consumptions. Continued growth
in military outlays at a time of economic stagnation appear
to be taken from consumption. If the Soviets invade Poland
it is doubtful if the Polish reaction will be of the Czecho-
slovakian type. If the casualties among the Poles are "only"
at the 19 56 Hungarian level, where tens of thousands were
killed, the Western response will certainly include larger
defense outlays.
With the Soviet economy stretched already, great increases
of defense spending would place a large burden on consumption
and/or investment. If the Soviets were forced to feed and
reconstruct a shattered Poland the cost could be very difficult
to maintain.
To the Soviet leadership the one pertinent question is
how much depravation are the Soviet citizenry willing to en-
dure before they become violent. Western observers have noted
for some time a profound crisis of spirit has fallen over the
U.S.S.R. The atmosphere of general invitation and virtual




Resentment and loss of faith, that their system is capable
of providing even the Russian's low expectations of living
standards is prevalent. With earnings only slightly larger
than 10 years ago, the worker is faced with prices that have
soared — 50 percent for restaurant meals, carpets, and sheep-
skin, 100 percent for gasoline, 300 percent rise for coffee
187in one year. Even the cost of drunkenness has risen 200-
300 percent in recent years. The price of the Volga auto-
mobile was raised from 9,000 to 15,000 rubles last summer,
more than ten years of an average worker's salary.
Basic food supplies are erratic. Travelers report that
at Gorsky, for example, there is no butter, meat, fruit and
flour, and that Kuibyshev residents must spend an entire day
in line when they hear that a shipment of chickens has arrived
At Yaroslavl meat supplies are so lacking that the stores now
18 8
sell caramels and tea instead.
Parts of the Soviet Union are under rationing. Cards
issued in Siberia granted two kilograms of meat, if any was
available. At Kazan the monthly ration is 400 grams, if it
can be obtained. Milk is said to be available only to those
with a valid prescription.
The level of turpitude is less than it once was , but the
awareness is greater. Furthermore, the increased knowledge
of conditions in other countries has helped decrease the
willingness to accept continued shortages. Festering feelings
of system decadence has resulted in an upsurge of national-
istic passions, which are anti-Russian by their very nature.
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Open protesting of subjugation of the Russian Empire is com-
mon now among Lithuanians, Ukranians, Estonians, Georgians,
Armenians, Uzbeks and many of the Muslim peoples. One author
noted, "With the glue of belief and trust gone, the regime is
weak, and holds itself together only by showing force to its
18 9
own people and to the world."
Despite such negative views of the Soviet Union the Rus-
sians continue to tolerate what even Eastern Europeans would
find intolerable. The Soviet system of control can be con-
sidered analogous to a boiler with social pressure as steam.
The pressure in the Soviet Society is enough to burst any
normal boiler, but the Soviet boiler is very thick and the
Russian is a slow boiling water.
Soviet propaganda with skillful selection, misrepresenta-
tion and distortion in combination with an incredible police
system has kept dissent bottled. How long it is capable of
doing so with the larger pressures of a Polish invasion remains
to be seen.
What is clear is that the Soviet Union is run by old,
naturally cautious men who are inclined not to take chances.
Poland is a critical problem with solutions that are not
predictable or assured. This is perhaps the single most in-
hibiting agent to Soviet action.
In conclusion, it is apparent that the Soviets face
enormous economic problems in the near future which defy easy
solutions. The Polish situation poses a dilemma to the Kremlin
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leaders which offers no simple answers. The Poles can only
become more independent and resistive as time passes, opening
up the possibility of a rapid spread of the "Polish disease"
throughout Eastern Europe as their economies falter. Never-
theless, the Russian economy is unhealthy and without reforms
faces only more difficulties in the future which greatly re-
stricts the number of options open in solving Polish
transgressions. The Soviets are confronted with a demographic
constraint, a difficult energy problem, hard currency earning
restraints, and a system that lacks the flexibility to solve
these critical difficulties.
The result of a Soviet invasion of Poland would very likely
mean economic chaos to the U.S.S.R. The Russian leaders are
certainly aware of this and, to a large extent, have refrained
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